USAID Testimony: Roger Winter, Assistant Administrator for DCHA

Roger Winter
Assistant Administrator
for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

Testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa
Committee on International Relations
U.S. House of Representatives
May 13, 2003

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for calling this hearing on Sudan at such a critical moment in time. In just a few days, May 16 will mark the 20th anniversary of this conflict. We hope it is the last. Sudan is at a historic milestone where the main parties to the civil war are seriously engaged in a peace process that may result in a just peace that ends this tragic war. Although the result is not certain and difficult points must still be negotiated, the parties know that they now have the best opportunity in many years to achieve peace.

A significant force behind the peace process is the serious and sustained engagement of the international community. The U.S. Government is the lead force, with the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) working closely together to use agreements on humanitarian issues as entry points for broader political agreements. The Nuba Mountains is the best example of this, where the U.S. approach transformed an intense war and severe food shortage in 2001 into a regional ceasefire with international monitors, vastly improved humanitarian access, freer movement of populations across political lines, and the beginnings of economic recovery. Heightened U.S. involvement in the peace process, led by the Department of State, has been matched by major new USAID development programs in opposition areas to prepare Sudan for peace.

Since the enactment of the Sudan Peace Act in October, the humanitarian situation in Sudan has improved dramatically. No longer is the Government routinely denying access to humanitarian agencies working under the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) framework. USAID joined with other agencies in the Administration in recommending that the President certify that the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement are negotiating in good faith and that negotiations should continue. I believe that certifying to the contrary would have essentially aborted the peace process, and this is not an acceptable outcome.

Despite all of the positive changes though, I am not unaware of the problems that exist and the crucial steps that must be taken to make any coming peace agreement just and lasting. Because there has been a pattern of violating agreements, I continue to worry about attacks on relief sites, attacks on civilians and human rights abuses. Any agreement must ensure that these transgressions do not reappear.

Today I will focus on the status of gaining unimpeded humanitarian access, the humanitarian challenges that remain, the development issues that must be addressed if this peace process is to be successful, and the steps that USAID has taken in preparing for peace.

Humanitarian Access

Background. The denial of humanitarian access by the Government of Sudan has long been the cause of great suffering in southern Sudan. For the first time in many years, I can say that we have greatly improved humanitarian access.

In 1989, the then Government of Sudan (GOS), the United Nations, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed an agreement of negotiated access to southern Sudan. It was established as the main avenue for assisting the Sudanese population affected by war. Each Sudanese party was afforded the right to deny access requested monthly by the UN Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) for security reasons. Several months after OLS began operations, the present government came to power and began regularly denying OLS access to numerous locations. The government invariably cited the security of international staff as the reason for denial, although OLS security officials, USAID humanitarian staff and non-governmental organizations with in-depth knowledge of the situation on the ground often disputed the government's security assessment.

Improved Humanitarian Access. USAID led an international effort to mobilize donors to uniformly pressure the GOS for unimpeded humanitarian access. On October 15, 2002, after the denial of access had become a crisis in September 2002, the GOS and the SPLM signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU), stating again that they agreed to allow unimpeded humanitarian access to all of Sudan. On October 25, a smaller technical group met with the UN and agreed to the form in which the MOU would be implemented. Essentially, they agreed to a notification system whereby the UN would simply notify the parties of its intended locations and the parties would not have the opportunity to deny these flights. So far, this agreement has held and access has been greatly expanded. The southern tip of Sudan, in Eastern Equatoria, for instance, was denied humanitarian assistance for four years. This area has been regularly receiving assistance since October 2002. Several key areas of Western Upper Nile, such as Leal and Lara, also started receiving assistance from OLS in October. While NGOs operating under the OLS umbrella have benefited from increased access, organizations outside OLS, which are continually supported by USAID, have expanded operations due to increased security.

After the signing of the MOU, the Government of Sudan initially regarded Southern Blue Nile as outside the agreement, because it was not historically a part of Operation Lifeline Sudan. Thanks to pressure by the international community, this was reversed, and in March 2003, humanitarian assistance began going into Southern Blue Nile. Non-OLS programs in Southern Blue Nile have also been able to function much more effectively. Before the cessation of hostilities, one organization nearly closed its program there when its compound and a nearby fuel store were nearly hit by a GOS bomb. Since the ceasefire, they have been able to effectively carry out their programs. These are major improvements in the last year, but obstacles remain.

Humanitarian Challenges.

Southern Blue Nile. While the GOS, for its part, has agreed on paper to unrestricted access to Southern Blue Nile, significant bureaucratic systems remain which make implementing programs cumbersome and difficult. While the UN has been very busy with planning for peace and other efforts, it has not matched its public commitment to the people of Southern Blue Nile with action. The UN is in the unfortunate position of having to follow cumbersome GOS requirements, and its own bureaucracy often moves at a slow pace. USAID and Department of State attempts to visit GOS-held sections of the area have been rebuffed by the GOS.
Western Upper Nile. Western Upper Nile has seen a continuation of conflict and helicopter attacks since the MOU for a cessation of hostilities was signed in mid-October. However, no direct militia attacks on civilians have been reported in the last month by OLS Security. Non-governmental organizations have wanted to access certain populations in Tam and Kerial, but these areas are too close to GOS positions, which make NGOs fearful of delivering assistance there. We are also concerned that the road and garrisons are preventing many displaced communities from returning to their home areas in time to plant this rainy season (which begins in May and June). In addition, since people's livelihoods require seasonal movements with cattle to and from the river, they must seasonally cross the road to reach critical dry season grazing areas. These communities are currently unwilling to cross this road due to continuing GOS harassment and looting of cattle.
Eastern Front. The Parties agreed to allow UN access to the Eastern Front (along the Eritrean border) in mid-January but so far, no such activities have been implemented. The problem here is in part that the UN has not aggressively pushed the parties for access to this area, despite a very desperate and needy population. USAID is providing assistance through two organizations, but the UN system is needed to deliver adequate levels of aid to the population at large.
Darfur. Tensions regarding the marginalization of the people of Darfur that have simmered for many years erupted into armed opposition against the Government in February. Tension increased in April when opposition forces attacked the capital of North Darfur and reportedly destroyed some aircraft. This region is also suffering from its third year of drought, and is one of the marginalized parts of Sudan with poor infrastructure and services. USAID staff recently visited the area and can confirm that these factors together create a very serious humanitarian situation. USAID has committed resources through NGOs to develop improved access to water, a critical area of need in Northern Darfur, as well as primary health care in Western Darfur. World Food Program food that was delivered to the main towns has not been distributed because of insecurity that keeps international staff and vehicles inside their compounds. Even if a political solution is achieved, Darfur will require an enormous amount of aid for a substantial period of time to raise its people's well-being to acceptable standards.

Post-Peace Humanitarian Plans
I realize that peace may well be imminent and humanitarian needs will still be pervasive in a post-peace environment. The war-affected regions of Sudan have long been isolated by conflict and lack of infrastructure. If peace is achieved, assistance programs will be able to reach areas where access has long been impossible. In spite of the large amount of international assistance to Sudan, many communities are not receiving basic services such as primary health care and education, nor do they have access to clean water. The immediate challenge will be to expand humanitarian programs to reach these populations. With a formal end to fighting and increased access to many areas, refugees and the internally displaced will start to move back to their home areas. Although the number of prospective returnees is still unknown, some estimates are that as many as 2 million of the more than 5 million refugees and internally displaced people will begin to move. It will be critical to make sure that historically densely populated areas where people will likely return have the infrastructure to accommodate them in the first six months after their arrival. One such area is Abyei, located on the dividing line between North and South, also called the transitional zone. Abyei has historically acted as a gateway between North and South. Its population is less than 5,000, compared to more than 85,000 in the past. USAID is intervening heavily in this area now. The stability of this entire transitional zone is also important in maintaining the overall peace agreement. In past peace agreements, tribal warfare has helped to destabilize larger peace processes. USAID is focusing on this zone with parallel programs on both sides of front lines, with some activities that cross front lines. In many cases local populations are tired of the civil war and working to reconcile among themselves as well. Seeing economic benefits from such reconciliation will be critical in helping them seal the agreements reached. Overall, USAID is leading an international effort to provide rapid and tangible benefits to Sudanese in the first six months after the peace agreement. This program will also build public confidence in the ongoing process of political transition.
Planning for Peace
In June of last year, USAID began inviting donors and the UN to periodic meetings in order to discuss the problems with humanitarian access and to plan joint actions. Since October, the focus has shifted to joint coordination on planning for peace. The latest meeting in The Hague expanded the actors to include other international organizations such as the World Bank and the Sudanese Parties. The purpose of the meeting was to pass on the process of setting program priorities to the Sudanese leadership. Just this past Saturday (May 10), the parties met, under US facilitation, to talk about capacity building for the pre-interim period and setting program priorities in the first 6 months after a peace agreement is reached. The meetings were more productive than expected, with the parties reaching agreement on key principles, priority areas and modalities for capacity building and a Joint Planning Mechanism for the quick-start program to be co-chaired by both sides with U.S. facilitation. A long-term focus of this same donors group will be development during the six-year interim period.
Transition to Development

USAID has been focusing much of its resources on issues and challenges that must be addressed if the Sudan peace process is to be successful.

Transition Initiatives

USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has begun work in Sudan for the first time. It plans to link ongoing southern Sudanese peace processes and peace-building efforts to initiatives that promote good governance practices to increase the participation of southern Sudanese in their governing structures. The OTI program focuses on critical transition issues in southern Sudan, such as increasing access to balanced information, promoting good governance, providing conflict resolution expertise in areas vulnerable to violence, and supporting people-to-people peace processes. OTI is also exploring opportunities to support quick-impact projects if a peace agreement is signed.

OTI's program in southern Sudan supports activities that will focus on building independent media in southern Sudan, conflict resolution mechanisms and tangible peace dividends, and good governance.

Development Challenges

As may be expected, Sudan's development challenges are enormous. Nearly twenty years of conflict in the current phase of the civil war has destroyed what limited physical infrastructure existed in southern Sudan. Schools, health clinics, courthouses, roads, bridges, wells, and markets have all been damaged or destroyed. In marginalized northern Sudan, the physical infrastructure has deteriorated over the years as energies and finances were sapped by the war.

The war has also damaged the social fabric needed to recover and develop. Traditional Sudanese cultures have proven to be amazingly resilient at the local level, but most regional institutions have simply not survived the trauma of war. Civil society is weak throughout the country and government structures are barely functional in the south. In the north, there is little political space outside a handful of traditional political parties, and dissent is treated harshly by the ruling National Islamic Front.

Economic recovery is underway in the stable areas of the south, but markets are tiny and businesses are few. A recent USAID-sponsored survey found that the two largest opposition-held towns in the south, Rumbek and Yei, respectively, only have about 2,500 and 1,500 micro and small enterprises. Market support institutions and services that usually nourish and sustain economic recovery, such as micro-finance institutions, business support services and training centers, do not yet exist.

The war has also done great damage to the potential of individual Sudanese to contribute to their own development. At least two generations of southern Sudanese have not had access to basic education. An estimated 4-5 million people have been internally displaced, including 2 million living in shantytowns around Khartoum. Repeated famines and food shortages have added to the misery, killing thousands and causing widespread malnutrition and abject poverty. Thousands of children recruited into the SPLA were demobilized in 2001, but communities have had minimal resources or opportunities to offer them.

USAID's Program in Support of the Peace Process

To address the numerous development challenges, USAID, in close collaboration with Sudanese stakeholders and our international partners, is now putting in place a new three-year strategy for Sudan. We have analyzed a broad range of possible scenarios, given the fluid and evolving situation there, and identified which development issues must be addressed to support a successful peace process. The Machakos peace plan now under negotiation calls for a six-month "pre-interim" period of preparation followed by a six-year interim period of southern autonomy. Power-sharing and wealth-sharing arrangements are to be further worked out between the national unity government and the southern autonomous government. Security arrangements will provide for a separation of forces. The Machakos negotiations are the best hope for peace Sudan has had since independence.

We are supporting the peace process and meeting associated development needs in several ways. First, USAID is directing all its programs toward the goal of preparing the Sudanese for peace, starting now, even before the peace agreement is signed. Second, we have closely collaborated with our international partners to develop a multi-donor, six-month action plan for assistance programs on two tracks: one for short-term, quick start projects in the pre-interim period and another for longer term projects that will build Sudanese self-reliance and capacity to undertake their own development.

Programs for the Pre-Interim Period. Once a peace agreement is signed, USAID plans to provide development assistance through community-identified, small-scale projects such as schools, health clinics, rural roads and water points to complement the above-mentioned humanitarian programs. Many projects will target communities receiving returning IDPs and refugees to lessen conflict over resources. These projects will be highly visible and quickly delivered to war-torn communities where the benefits of peace can be dramatically illustrated.
Longer-term development projects. Our long-term development programs for southern Sudan are already underway, and more are planned to start this year. Following Administrator Natsios' visit to Sudan in July 2001, he announced the creation of two new five-year initiatives: the $20 million Sudan Basic Education Program and the $22.5 million Southern Sudan Agriculture Revitalization Program. Through these programs we are training teachers, rehabilitating schools, establishing agribusiness training centers to help entrepreneurs get the business skills they need and starting a microfinance institution that will provide small loans. In addition, we are helping southerners to strengthen their civilian administrations; rebuild courthouses, train judges, and carry out civic education programs. We are repairing roads that are critical to the delivery of relief, and will soon begin a program to improve road and telecommunications infrastructure across the vast spaces of southern Sudan to promote recovery of markets and trade. In FY 2004, we have increased USAID's request levels for development assistance and child survival and health to $66 million to help southern Sudan in its reconstruction efforts.

Conclusion

I would like to close with some observations gleaned from our experience with development efforts in southern Sudan in recent years, especially the experience of the Sudan Transitional Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) program. We are convinced that it is vital to emphasize Sudanese ownership and participation in all our programs, so they take the lead in their own development and become more self-reliant. Equally important is to emphasize equity, especially between women and men and between Sudan's many ethnic groups, so that our assistance does not contribute to unequal access to resources, hence spawn new conflicts. We also have learned that our development investments will go nowhere without capable leadership, good governance, and a sound legal and policy framework. We are therefore implementing technical and logistical assistance to those southerners who will make up the departments of the future government of the autonomous southern entity. Finally, we have learned that everything takes time in southern Sudan, so we are not waiting. We have already started.