This is an archived USAID document retained on this web site as a matter of public record.
Statement of Carol Peasley, Acting Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Africa
Before the Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C., July 30, 1997
U.S. Agency for International Development
Introduction
Good afternoon, Chairman Royce, Congressman Menendez, and members of the Sub-committee. I would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify regarding recent political
developments in Kenya and their implications for our engagement with this nation. Today I will
amplify Ambassador Twaddell's remarks on U.S. government policy with more focussed
information on how USAID programs address democratization in Kenya.
I would hope you would come away from today's session with a better understanding of
three major points:
First, how Kenya deals with the current political challenges it faces will have critical
implications for its own future development and for that of the region as a whole. The
challenges encompass the constitution, the electoral process, human rights, and deep-seated
corruption. Recent events have brought these issues to the surface once again and could result
in severe economic dislocation and stagnation.
Second, in spite of these problems, USAID believes we must stay engaged in Kenya
because of its economic development potential and importance in the region.
And, third, we believe that the current situation provides a real opportunity for USAID, not only to continue what are long-standing and effective development programs, but also to
support the Kenyan people as they work their way through these political and economic issues.
Constitutional and Legal Crisis
While recent developments have highlighted unresolved constitutional and legal issues in
Kenya, the issues themselves are not new. They have been the most prominent issues since
before the 1992 election. In fact, these issues were identified as central in USAID's 1995
review of its democracy and governance strategy. Other donors and observers have come to
agree with this ground-breaking USAID assessment.
The debate focusses on two levels of reforms which must be undertaken for a successful
democratic transition. At the underlying level are systemic constitutional and legal reforms
which create an enabling environment for democracy to flourish. At the second level are
reforms which focus on the forthcoming election, particularly the obstacles that prevent
opposition parties from competing with the ruling party on a level playing field. Many Kenyans
and international partners -- including the United States -- have repeatedly called for political
reforms. In response, President Moi has made minimal concessions and continued to resist real
reform. Many donors have set the marker of free and fair elections -- currently scheduled
toward the end of the year -- as a measure of the Government's commitment to the democratic
process.
However, we must not lose sight of the need for changes in underlying structures and
institutions which can sustain democracy in Kenya over time. Indeed to some extent, these two sets of issues, which might have been dealt with separately, are now merging and will have to
be addressed to some degree simultaneously.
Though progress on political reform has been disappointing to date, recent political
developments do allow opportunity for dialogue with the Kenyan government and with the
opposition parties, and an opportunity for civil society to play an increasingly visible and vocal
role in demanding government transparency and accountability. We are hopeful that recent
discussions between the government and the opposition will lead to commitment to democratic
reform. This dialogue also needs to involve civil society, including those groups which have
bravely stood up to argue for reform.
Why remain in Kenya?
Kenya is central to the broader development prospects of the East Africa region -- both
politically and economically. Its continued stability is crucial to regional stability and to the
long-term development of the Horn. If Kenya remains stable, there are excellent prospects for
accelerated economic growth, increased regional integration, and reduced tensions among East
African states. If, on the other hand, it becomes destabilized and descends into more severe
factional strife, the prospects for a stable, prosperous region will be greatly diminished.
In spite of recent events, Kenya remains the strongest regional economy; it has a vibrant
private sector and serves as the trading and commercial hub for the Horn. It is also the port of
entry and transfer for humanitarian commodities for needy populations throughout the region.
Even though Kenya is performing below its economic potential, trade with the U.S. private sector is on the rise. There are more than 75 American companies doing business in Kenya
today with many others planning to begin regional operations there. For example, Coca-Cola
recently moved a significant number of managers to Kenya in a major expansion of their
operations. In sub-Saharan Africa, the Kenyan financial systems and commercial infrastructure
are second only to those of South Africa.
Clearly, however, the Government of Kenya (GOK) must address the pervasive
corruption that stifles growth if Kenya is to realize its economic potential and to improve and
expand trade and investment opportunities. The GOK has shown limited interest in addressing
this serious problem.
The Government's commitment to economic reform has also been inconsistent. While
the GOK has taken significant steps to adopt important macro-economic reforms, there has been
some recent decline. As a result of this and other factors, investors, both public and private,
are beginning to lose confidence in the Kenyan economy. If economic and governance reforms
encouraged by the International Financial Institutions and other donors are not undertaken and
if performance is not more consistent and sustained, Kenya's potential will never be achieved.
This would be disruptive for the region.
Because of its regional influence and stature, Kenya is critical to President Clinton's
Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI), which has as its core premise, increased regional
integration in East Africa. This Initiative is intended to attack the root causes of food insecurity
and conflict in the Greater Horn region. Kenya is pivotal to increased integration through IGAD
(the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development), as well as to efforts to resolve ongoing
crises or prevent future crises in the Greater Horn. President Moi has been a major player in official and unofficial peace efforts throughout the region. For example, he is working with
other African leaders to find peaceful solutions to the conflicts in Sudan and Somalia.
Kenya is one of the few East African countries which has not confronted civil war in the
last 20 years. The impact of severe conflict in Kenya would not only undermine its economic
growth and the standard of living of its population. Instability in Kenya would inhibit regional
production and trade and sharply increase the costs of relief and economic development to the
neighboring countries. In addition, Kenya's neighbors closely watch the political events there
and these events resonate throughout the region -- for better or worse.
USAID Programs
In spite of the current situation, USAID continues to believe that Kenya has the potential
to be a good development partner. The goal of the USAID program remains the promotion of
"broad-based sustainable economic growth in Kenya contributing to crisis prevention in the Horn
of Africa". As part of this goal, USAID works almost exclusively with Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) in the areas of family planning and HIV/AIDs, micro-enterprise
development, environment, and democracy and governance. In all of these areas, our programs
show great promise and there are lessons to be learned by other East African countries.
USAID has played a critical role in promoting family planning in Kenya for more than
a decade, with particular emphasis on expanding access to services. These programs have
achieved some of the most precipitous declines in fertility ever recorded, from an average of 7.6
births per woman from 1984-89 to 4.8 in 1996. Population growth rates during the same period declined from over 4 percent to 2.7 percent per year.
Within the next ten years, HIV/AIDS is likely to become Kenya's most serious health
and economic problem. National seroprevalence is currently estimated to be 7.5 percent,
affecting over one million people, and is predicted to rise to 10 percent by the year 2000.
USAID is a key donor to HIV/AIDs prevention and health care financing, providing models that
have been adopted widely throughout the region.
Poverty and rapid population growth pose a serious threat to Kenya's natural resources.
Overcrowding is pushing low-income farmers into forests and other fragile areas, particularly
around Kenya's economically important national wildlife parks. USAID's environmental
program is encouraging community groups near the parks to participate in decisions on the best
ways to develop these buffer zones.
Economic growth is absolutely essential to alleviate the main sources of conflict in
Kenya, such as poverty and unemployment. USAID's programs aim at transforming Kenya's
smallholder agriculture from semi-subsistence to commercially-oriented systems. USAID's
micro-enterprise program continues to play a leading role in employment creation as micro-enterprises account for 60 percent of all private sector employment.
Over the years, USAID's strategy for providing assistance to Kenya has evolved in
response to deteriorating accountability and governance by the Moi government. In the past,
USAID worked primarily with the government on development activities. To reflect concerns
about human rights and other abuses, USAID budget levels to Kenya have been reduced since
1991 -- and have not been restored. In addition, USAID has shifted the implementation of its
programs almost exclusively to the non-governmental and private sectors.
Democracy and Governance
The current state of constitutional and legal restrictions in Kenya inhibit both free and
fair elections and the creation of an enabling environment necessary for sustaining democracy.
There are discussions among Kenyans over the need for and most effective timing of the several
reforms. The opposition is asking that all major reforms --policy, legal, and constitutional --
be undertaken before the election. The government is suggesting that some smaller measures
be implemented now and that an overall review of the constitution and legal system be postponed
until after the elections.
Since the 1992 elections, USAID has sought to address the range of issues by creating
effective demand for sustainable political, constitutional and legal reform. The Kenya program
focuses on two areas: 1) strengthening civil society; and 2) developing a more transparent and
fair electoral process. USAID believes that the current outpouring of demands for a more open
system represent a considerable success in our efforts to strengthen civil society. Partly as a
result of our efforts, between 1992 and 1996 the number of NGOs has increased from 400 to
710, nearly 100 of which are primarily involved in advocacy work and building human rights
awareness. We have had less success in promoting a more open electoral process because of
the Moi Government's continued resistance to reforms.
USAID is the leading donor in the democracy and governance sector, funding grants to
diverse NGOs and interest groups involved in such activities as constitutional reform, coalition
building, and documenting human rights abuses, among others. USAID is also providing
funding to NGOs for election-related activities in the areas of civic education, constitutional reform, and election monitoring. USAID is also working actively to coordinate donor efforts
and provide timely analysis to all those following developments in Kenya.
Since the early 1990s, there has been a cycle of strong donor pressures for political
reform and minimal progress by the Government of Kenya. The Moi regime has been able to
employ an array of tactics to avoid implementing reforms. The current situation may well be
the latest iteration in this cycle.
In 1990, the regime came under intense international pressure to liberalize its economic
and political systems. By the end of 1991, key donors agreed to suspend balance of payments
support until President Moi produced solid evidence of real commitment to reform. Concerned
over a range of economic, governance, and human rights issues, USAID suspended all balance
of payments support to the GOK. As result of combined donor and domestic pressure, President
Moi asked the Parliament to rescind the 1982 constitutional amendment -- Section 2[a] -- that
had legalized the one-party state. However, other constitutional and legal provisions that
restricted the media, political gatherings and political activities were not eliminated or modified.
This created an environment in which opposition parties felt they could not compete fairly with
the incumbent party, KANU, and resulted in a 1992 election which left considerable
dissatisfaction.
Since then, there have been no significant changes in the constitution or legal code that
would suggest a better outcome for the upcoming elections. In fact, certain key components
have not improved during the 1992-1997 period, including the status of the electoral commission
and cohesion of the opposition. At the same time, grassroots support for constitutional reform
has grown significantly. In 1992, the Electoral Commission lacked independence, transparency and fair opposition representation. In 1997 thus far, conditions appear about the same. In 1992,
there was not a unified approach on the part of the opposition running for presidential and local
positions. Currently, while the opposition is much more divided in terms of the number of
parties, it is striving towards greater cohesion on reform issues. In 1992, there was strong
support for the electoral process by civil society and grassroots organizations. Thus far in the
run up to this election, voter skepticism seems to be a problem and non-governmental groups
are openly critical of lack of reforms. Finally, there has been little real progress in removing
or modifying existing constitutional and legal provisions such as the Preservation of Public
Security Act, the Public Order Act, the Political Parties Bill, and others which limit political
space in Kenya.
There are clearly a series of changes which must be made if the upcoming elections are
to be free and fair. As the elections draw closer, the Government and the opposition -- as well
as civil groups -- are debating the timeframe in which these changes should take place. There
is a need to focus on repealing or suspending laws and policies which restrict political party
competition and create an obstacle to free and fair elections. These measures limit or prohibit
access to the ballot by all eligible voters, access to the electorate by political parties, access to
the media, freedom of association, and access to civic education. In addition, there is a need
to undertake a serious review of the constitution, as well as the legal framework; the
independence of the electoral commission, the ability of individual candidates to run for office,
and separation of powers are among the issues that will need to be examined.
The recent incidents of political violence have intensified domestic and international
demand for change. In response, President Moi announced that he would establish a parliamentary commission on post election reforms. Though still engaged in the process,
opposition groups, as well as civil society, have been critical that the government has not been
willing to discuss their reform agenda. It is unclear how significant these events are -- whether
Moi has been pushed to undertake a true constitutional reform process or whether this is simply
the next iteration of minimal steps to quiet critics.
Conclusions
No one can predict with any certainty the outcome of recent events in Kenya. Though
many problems remain, we believe there are modest signs of progress and that this is a critical
period of political transition. For that reason, we believe that we must stay engaged. Carefully
targeted development assistance has resulted in increased employment and incomes for the poor,
decreased fertility rates, and a more pluralistic society. In the absence of political alternatives,
it is the expansion of civil society which is resulting in public pressure for political reform.
Continued USAID support of an expansive and vocal civil society is essential. We believe that
we must stay the course to support a peaceful transition and promote the foundations on which
democracy can be built over the long-term.
Having said this, we also believe that it is ultimately the Kenyan people who must take
responsibility for a process and a form of government which is accountable and which allows
them to realize their potential.
Thank you.
This is an archived USAID document retained on this web site as a matter of public record.
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Last Updated on: July 18, 2001
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