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This is an archived USAID document retained on this web site as a matter of public record.
Foreign Press Center Briefing by Andrew S. Natsios
Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development
Report on Recent Trip to Sudan
May 31, 2002
MODERATOR: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It is my pleasure to welcome back to the Foreign Press Center yet again Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development Mr. Andrew Natsios. He is here, as you know, to report on his recent trip to the Sudan. With him is Mr. Roger Winter, who is the assistant administrator of the agency for democracy, conflict and humanitarian assistance, and Ms. Constance Berry Newman, who is the assistant administrator for Africa.
All three of them will have remarks this morning, and then we'll take your questions. I'd also like to welcome our colleagues from the Sudanese Embassy and remind all non-journalists in the audience that we do really like the journalists to shape the questioning. So we'll be glad to take the journalists' questions at the end of the remarks. Please wait for the microphone, and introduce yourself by name and organization. Thank you very much.
MR. NATSIOS: I think just procedurally we each will speak and then we'll answer questions afterwards.
The purpose of our trip, which just concluded early this week, was to assess the implementation of the Danforth initiatives--and Roger Winter will speak on this subject after me; secondly, to review the USAID development initiatives that we began designing late last year in stable areas of Southern Sudan--Connie Newman will talk about that in a few minutes; and then the third purpose of the trip was to encourage the two sides in the conflict to continue to provide unimpeded access for humanitarian relief to critical areas of the south, especially Western Upper Nile and Northern Baragazal. We've requested of the Sudanese government a 30-day cease-fire in these areas. The SPLA has agreed to it. As of the time of the visit, the government had not; it was under consideration. I think there were some meetings that had been held by the U.N. envoy since that time with the government.
What we are concerned about is that, in the next three or four weeks, that the heavy rains will come--the rainy season begins--and that in both these areas, in Northern Baragazal and Western Upper Nile, and also in the Nuba Mountains, many roads will become inaccessible and many regions--areas will become inaccessible, many villages will become inaccessible because the roads become very difficult to travel on. And so if this access is not allowed very shortly, then food can't get into these areas, and medical supplies, until after the rainy season is over--which is something that was of considerable concern to us.
We met with an assistant to President Bashir who is in charge of the conflict issues, and we also met with the minister of international cooperation, in Khartoum, for the Northern government. Then we visited both the government of Sudan-side of the Nuba Mountains cease-fire, and then in the SPLA-held areas of the Nuba Mountains. We met with political leaders on both sides of the conflict line in Nuba Mountains. The cease-fire is holding, and I'll talk about that in a minute.
We also visited the Western Upper Nile province--not exactly in the middle of the conflict, but south of it; and we met with chiefs from the principal tribe in that region, the Nuer tribe, and community leaders and NGO leaders from the area of the most intense conflict, around the oil fields. And then we visited Equitoria Province and saw two AID development projects that are just beginning there.
A couple of observations. The first is that the cease-fire, as I said before, is holding. I would say that the most hopeful sign we saw on the trip that could be built on in the future is the Nuba Mountain cease-fire. The joint military commission, which is led by General Wilhelmsen of Norway, with eight other countries, including the United States, participating, is working operationally on the ground now, and they're doing a number of things which are building support for the commission in the Nuba Mountains on both sides of the conflict. That is a good sign. General Wilhelmsen has been involved in eight other operations of this sort, either with the U.N.--this is not a U.N. operation, but similar sorts of military oversight efforts. And he is very wise in this, and I think he's chosen some tactics and strategies operationally on the ground that we think are very constructive.
There has been, or appears to be, an exchange on both sides, of military and political officers at the local level, which I don't think has--we're trying to go back to see whether this has happened before operationally in the field, and we don't think it has in the 19 years at this phase of the civil war. So that's a favorable sign; which is to say people from one side in the conflict are visiting the other side, and the other side is visiting. So there's this exchange going on, which is, even though it's at a lower level, a confidence-building measure that we think is important.
Attacks on civilians do continue. The night before we arrived, in Western Upper Nile there was a bombing incident of civilian targets in the south. I think a couple dozen people were killed; another 75 were severely wounded--the ICRC hospital in Lokichokio was full of war-wounded. And then we met with the Nuer chiefs, and that night the Sudanese government bombed right in the epicenter, where the chiefs were from, in the middle of the night--which we found disturbing. It was civilian targets, from what we could see, and it was odd from our perspective that the bombing took place right where the chiefs that we had met with were from. And it is not near the conflict area.
So those problems still continue. But there were signs of hope and there were signs of progress, although they were not consistent across the board.
Thank you. Roger?
MR. WINTER: Sudan is the biggest country in Africa and it has the biggest aggregation of war-related civilian deaths. When the president designated former Senator John Danforth to be the peace envoy for the country, the team that he put together decided to try to do the following kinds of activities--activities that would, first of all, benefit the little people on the ground immediately; secondly, that would require that the two warring parties have to give something, they have to surrender something, so to speak; and third, that they could be building blocks toward something larger, perhaps a political solution of some sort.
So what Senator Danforth did was derive four tests. These were not political initiatives to solve all the problems, but they were to test the intentions of the warring parties so that the U.S. could make up its mind if it was going to substantially engage for the longer term in a peace process in Sudan.
Those four tests, very quickly, first of all, had to do in the first instance with the Nuba Mountains directly. For those of you who know Sudan, the Nuba Mountains is not in the south, it's in the central part of the country. It's sort of African culturally, but not in any way directly linked by land to the south. It is an area where the conflict has had an impact on the civilian population to perhaps the most noticeable degree. It's been an area isolated for a long time. What the initiative did was provide for, first of all, a negotiated cease-fire between the parties; and then secondly, that USAID and the U.N. and others would together perform a comprehensive humanitarian assessment of the civilian needs in both sectors, and then prepare a response to those needs.
As Andrew Natsios said a moment ago, the cease-fire is holding, and it is the fact that it is holding that is the stellar feature to the whole Danforth initiative. It's a sight to see. I've had the opportunity to be in the Nuba Mountains twice in the last couple of weeks, and large numbers of civilians are moving around, they're moving across the military lines. In a lot of cases, they're sort of coming down from the mountains and seeking to be able to cultivate properties that they may have cultivated in the past before the war drove them off. So it is, for some of us who have seen the place before, it is a sight to behold and it is perhaps the best fruit of the whole initiative.
There also is to be, and is in fact already initiated, a substantial humanitarian and development assistance program on both sides, and that is moving forward. USAID is making very substantial commitments in both sectors, primarily through private nongovernmental organizations, such as Save the Children, which actually works on both sides of the military line. That humanitarian program's been a little bit slow getting up. We particularly had difficulties with the government adding a process to what was negotiated in the cease-fire agreement, a process for access for humanitarian purposes. There's a joint military commission that determines who can access and who cannot access the various locations. The government added an additional clearance by the Humanitarian Assistance Commission, and it took some time to negotiate out that particular problem. But just before Administrator Natsios arrived there, the problem was worked out and the assistance flights began to move, dropping seeds and tools in the SPLA area, and food deliveries to follow; and the same thing happening in the government-controlled sector.
The second feature of the Danforth initiative involved the eradication of three diseases, first of all polio. Polio is an initiative in Sudan in particular because there's a reservoir of active polio, a wild polio virus in Sudan. The U.N. had a program. That program was impeded regularly by denial of access by the government for flights to land in association with that eradication effort, and sometimes by conflict between the SPLA and the government. What was negotiated would require both conflicting parties to stand down militarily and also to, on the part of the government, not ban flights in association with the eradication programs. It's been a little bit rocky, but it's improved every month, and we are satisfied that the polio eradication program is moving well now with the cooperation of both sides.
The second disease that we're seeking to eradicate is a cattle disease called rinderpest. It has substantial capacity to undermine the food security of populations in countries like Sudan. And while we didn't get the full cooperation that we sought in this eradication program, in fact USAID has gone forward and it is eradicating the disease in the southeastern part of the country in both the government- and the rebel-held sectors of Sudan. We're on target. That will be completed by the 30th of June, and the likelihood is that Sudan will then be certified as rinderpest-free, which is a real boon when it comes to international marketing of livestock and that kind of thing.
The third disease to be eradicated that we're working on is guinea worm. I ain't gonna tell you about guinea worm; it is a horribly painful, very ugly kind of disease. Eighty-five percent of the world's guinea worm is in Sudan. The Carter Center has been working for some time to eradicate the disease, but because of the conflict they are not able to cover parts of the country, very substantial parts of the country. In fact, what we did was negotiate an arrangement in which, in the Nuba Mountains as well as in certain other parts of the country, what we call Abillet [ph] twitch, that the eradication program could move forward. And we've recently granted the Carter Center a substantial amount of money to proceed to do that.
That takes care of the second initiative. The third had to do with the issue of slavery and abduction, a very controversial issue. The government of Sudan asserts that it doesn't have slavery as such, but there is obviously a practice that is very problematic that occurs in parts of the country. Senator Danforth proposed a commission, a multi-national commission, to take a look at the issue. Their report on--was it last week?--while we were in Sudan, but they issued their report in Khartoum. In conjunction with that report, which I won't attempt to characterize here, USAID is implementing programs between the population of people who are periodically raided and those who do the raiding--so-called Dinka Bagarra [?] programs. It's designed to help facilitate local peace. It requires the collaboration of both warring parties. And we're just in the process of seeking to implement that now.
The fourth initiative had to do with attacks against civilians. Civilians are attacked regularly in Sudan in one way or another. Most often, people refer to this as the "bombing" of civilians, but that's just one of the ways. And in that particular program, Senator Danforth sought an international monitoring capacity to be located in several parts of Sudan, with air capacity so that it could come on-line very quickly when an attack occurs, could document what happened, and in fact then begin to issue reports. That program is just now coming on-line. There's not a lot of fault attached to either the rebel or the government parties to the conflict. Our own initiative has taken a little time to get up. It's coming on-line now and ought to be actually visiting sites in which civilians have been gratuitously attacked in the very near future.
That's the status of the Danforth initiatives. The question is where do we go from here. Last week, the week before last, while we were in Sudan, the president and Senator Danforth met. There is a U.S. commitment to continue to engage in Sudan with the hope of moving from those limited tests to trying to solve or reach an overall just political settlement to the conflict. That's a commitment that the president has made, it's a commitment that AID will very much be a part of, along with other aspects of the U.S. government.
Thank you.
MS. NEWMAN: And I think that everybody agrees that dealing with peace and the transition is very important, but it's not enough; that it is extremely important that we assist in building for the future. In that regard, the administrator tasked the Africa Bureau to work on two major initiatives, one an agricultural initiative, and the other an education initiative.
Southern Sudan has major natural resources and has the potential of being a major producer of agricultural products. Given that, there is an understanding that there is work to be done--training, increasing the potential for capital, and increasing the capacity of the commodity networks. So that the $22 million, 5-year proposal will do just that, increasing agricultural skills, increasing access to capital; and with regard to the capacity of commodities, the people will be working with shaynuts [ph], hides and skins, and bee keeping. While we were there, we did have the opportunity to see some of the first stages of what will happen. We went to a mechanized farm, where people are now working with tractors--which, as everyone here understands, will make it much easier for them to be successful.
The second major initiative is the education initiative, and I think we all know some of the statistics--only 20 to 30 percent of the children are enrolled in school, only about 12 percent, 13 percent make it past the fourth grade. Teachers are voluntary, and that does not contribute to assurance that the school system is going to work. So that under this initiative we have a 5-year, $20 million plan in three regions of Southern Sudan. That will take improving teacher education, improving the capacity for primary and secondary schools, and improving non-formal education.
Specifically, we are proposing to fund four regional teacher-training institutes. There will be training for over 2,000 women teachers. We will be building, and we've got people--we're real happy to hear this--that will be involved in building over 200--actually, 240 primary schools and 10 secondary schools. This is all in Southern Sudan. And promoting non-formal distance learning for over 20,000 out-of-school youth.
With regard to the status of both of these proposals, we now are in the final stages of selecting and working out the next step of putting these in place. So by the end of June, with regard to both, we will probably be making announcements as to who will be doing the work and what the schedule will be.
MODERATOR: And now we'll take journalists' questions.
MR. COBB: Charlie Cobb of allAfrica.com.
The other day, Sudan's minister of cooperation said there were certain--I think he called it "necessary principles" for humanitarian assistance. Two of the key ones seem to have been that Operation Lifeline Sudan should operate out of Khartoum and that, in general, relief to Sudan should be distributed internally, from inside Sudan. The SPLA does not agree to this. I'm wondering is this acceptable to USAID?
MR. NATSIOS: It is not acceptable, and if it were implemented it would destroy the relief program in the south. Fifty percent of our assistance is in SPLA-held areas, 50 percent is in government-held areas in the south. The principle of Operation Lifeline Sudan since it was created in 1988 was to allow the northern held areas to be served from the north and the southern held areas to be served through Lokichokio in northern Kenya. That has been the principle for 13 years. As far as we're concerned, that is still the principle. Any change in that will disrupt the relief effort and endanger people's lives, and we would not accept it.
QUESTION: Meshir, Sudan.
I have two questions, the first one concerning the OLS. According to the Internet last night, still there are some conflicting signals--the government saying everything's okay, the United Nations people saying no, no, we still have some to negotiate. Tell me, what are you going to--how do you fit here all the good things I heard? Are they going to be part of this, or that's going to be singular? And then I have another question.
MR. WINTER: Sir, nice to see you. The U.S. expects to undertake a very broad-based initiative from here on out. All the particulars are not in place. Now, the issue I think you're referring to--and I'm not sure, so bear with me; I just returned myself and I haven't seen all the e-mails and things like that--is in fact there has been a debate going about access to Western Upper Nile, in particular. Western Upper Nile is an area where there's a lot of conflict right now. The whole issue of access to there and the lack of clarity around what's been agreed to and not been agreed to is something that we're all experiencing even today.
As we understand it, there has been some kind of arrangement that's been discussed that would control access to Western Upper Nile--an arrangement that would operate entirely through government-controlled territory. That is, as Mr. Natsios pointed out, a violation of the underpinnings of Operation Lifeline Sudan. Basically, the whole foundation of Operation Lifeline Sudan would fall apart, in our view, if in fact that were to be the way things actually were operated.
So the whole issue of humanitarian access is a part of the way the U.S. initiative is approaching the conflict zones. We understand that the government has concerns about sovereignty, we understand that the rebels as well as many of the NGOs as well as the international community at large has concerns about how the government could be impartial in humanitarian transactions if in fact it's a party to the very war itself. Therefore, there's a built-in provision in Operation Lifeline Sudan that gives the international community the right of initiative in terms of delivering humanitarian supplies to non-government-controlled areas.
So this is a longstanding debate. It's a debate that isn't entire over. It's going to be a clear part of a future U.S. initiative to resolve, hopefully once and for all to the satisfaction, ideally, of both parties, how access will be handled for populations in conflict zones.
Does that answer your question, Mr. Meshir?
QUESTION: My second question is general. It's quite evident that you are trying to introduce a culture of peace in a very practical way, which is really great. Are the two sides getting the point? Are they ready to deal with the culture of peace?
MR. NATSIOS: Well, while there are two sides militarily, there aren't two sides in a political and social sense. If you talk to the people who live in the north but are not part of the government, they would have a very different perspective than people who are leading the government. And that's true in the south as well, on the issue of peace.
I think the civilians in the north and the south are ready for a peace agreement. I'm not sure the political leaders are entirely ready. I think there are faction within the northern government that would like peace, but there are other factions which were more militant that are not in favor of peace. So I think it's a question of which faction will win out and carry the day.
There are clearly people in the Nuba Mountains who are indigenous Nuba people, who are in leadership positions in the regional government that reports to Khartoum, that want peace because they're Nuba people. They're on the government-held side and they're government officials, but they're from Nuba. And in SPLA-held areas, there are Nuba people in leadership positions who also want peace.
So we saw more evidence of cooperation on the issue of peace at the regional and local level in Nuba than we did necessarily nationally. I think the national will have to come later during the peace process, but it has to be negotiated. It will be a matter of people beginning to trust each other, some confidence-building measures, and maybe that will lead to some serious discussion about an overall settlement, which is what we hope for.
MR. WINTER: Just very quickly--in a fair number of communities that are in conflict zones, what we are hearing as we go around is why don't you come--meaning the American initiative--why don't you come and do what you did in Nuba in our territory? So, for example, in the Abillet area, this is an area, as you know very well, sort of on the front line between north and south. And I was there for two and a half, three days last week. And the thing we heard over and over again, including from people at the governor's level down to the very local population: Why don't you Americans come here and try to accomplish what you did in the Nuba Mountains? So the culture of peace amongst the population is very obvious, and people at the local level want it very passionately.
QUESTION: My name is Adu Asare [ph], a reporter for Africanews.com.
Mr. Natsios, not too long ago, I covered a conference where you spoke. And you enumerated some principles in connection with humanitarian activities after a conflict. And the part that I retained was the program towards retaining the people in conflict to be a [inaudible] basis. Did you find--do you have any chance of doing that in Southern Sudan at this time? And while you are at it, would you tell us--
MR. NATSIOS: Is this the thing at SEIS [?]--is this Johns Hopkins?
QUESTION: Yes, sir. Could you tell us the relationship between your agency and other U.S. agencies in the Sudan?
MR. NATSIOS: Well, I report to Colin Powell. USAID is not part of the State Department. We are an independent agency. But my boss is Colin Powell and ultimately, of course, both of ours is the president. And they have been given very clear instructions to us as to what they want done. The president is very concerned about the war in Sudan and some of the human rights problems and wants to take aggressive action on them and has given me very clear instructions, as has Secretary Powell, to do what we're doing now, both in the development side that Connie Newman just announced, and on the humanitarian side that Roger Winter has been working on.
One of the things I mentioned at Johns Hopkins was that you have to look at how the local economy is either contributing to conflict or contributing toward peace. Because you can rearrange--you can manage the incentives, economic incentives that are at play. They are not terribly visible sometimes. If there's a peace--soldiers from a peace commission, like the ones we have in the Nuba Mountains, and they're buying a lot of products on the local markets on both sides of the conflicts, well then the merchants are going to say, well, we kind of like these troops here because they're contributing to the local economy. That's a positive incentive because it calms everyone down and it creates a constituency among the community people for the existence of peace-keeping troops, which is a good thing.
So you have to look at how the economy is affected negatively or positively in terms of the conflict. That's one of the things I suggested.
The other thing is that one of the principles that we should be focused on in reconstruction is the whole notion of self-sufficiency--making people capable of supporting themselves without relief. There's a principle--we call it spot reconstruction or developmental relief--where you begin the process of reconstruction before the conflict is over. I also talked about that at SEIS. And that's what we're doing in the south. The things that Connie Newman was just talking about we will be doing in stable areas of the south. Many of them have been stable, actually, for the entire war. And there's no reason that schools can't be built in those areas and that developmental projects in the agricultural area can't be initiated to begin to build some stability economically and educationally to lay the foundation and prepare the south for a peace agreement.
I'm not sure I answered your question.
QUESTION: [inaudible--off mike]
MR. NATSIOS: The culture?
QUESTION: Are people going to be able to retain, say, the religious inclination without attack from government, for example?
MR. NATSIOS: Well, obviously, from the perspective of an American, people's right to practice their own religious beliefs, whether they be Muslim or Christian or animist, is at the center of what human rights is about. And that's of great concern to the president and of the secretary of state and all of us here. Sudan is a country of several religious traditions, whether you're in the north or the south. And how to deal with that issue in the context of the peace settlement is one of the central issues, but not the only issue, of the peace conferences that will be held in the future. So, we think it can be resolved, but we're not the ones doing the negotiating. The people that will have to negotiated that are the southerners and the northerners.
MODERATOR: We have time for one more question.
QUESTION: Would you comment on the current U.S. demining efforts in Nuba Mountains?
MR. WINTER: There is a demining program which is being--Ronco. There's a sub-agreement with Ronco, which is an American corporate entity, which has begun some demining operations in the Nuba Mountains. I actually visited a site--first of all, I should mention the fact that mines are not thought to be as large an issue in Sudan as they have been in many other conflicts. Which doesn't mean if you hit one you feel any better about it, obviously. This demining operation is just beginning. It's designed to clear pathways or small roads between the two sectors in particular locations so it can open up commerce and travel back and forth. This is at the very beginning stage. But what I can tell you is I stood on one of these paths with these guys and their demining apparatus, that looked like Martians, you know, or space-ship kind of occupants, with their dogs. And down the trail came a woman from the SPLA sector and we engaged her in a conversation. She was actually passing for the first time into the government-held sector so she could, in effect, do her shopping. So the demining program will clear pathways for people to be able to do that without putting themselves at risk. But it's just now being implemented.
MODERATOR: Let's take one more.
MR. LOEB: Jim Loeb, InterPress Service.
I know it's not exactly your area that is, kind of, what general U.S. policy is toward peace-making, but obviously you're very much involved in how to put it together. And you've stressed today that what you heard at the grass-roots level were people saying can't we do a cease-fire here like at Nuba. Now, one of the concerns of the SPLA is, obviously, this kind of rolling cease-fire and that it will eventually move into the oil area, and then you can get a national cease-fire before a political settlement without resolving any of the issues of the Declaration of Principles in the [inaudible] process.
Can you clarify exactly what U.S. policy is regarding these issues in light of the Danforth report?
MR. NATSIOS: I'm not going to get into the details of it because then it will compromise the negotiations. I am aware of the concern of the SPLA. And if both sides are uncomfortable with what we're doing, there's not going to be a peace settlement. That's what you have to have to have a settlement; both sides have to buy into the process or whatever is agreed to will ultimately fail. There's a large part of the south, of the center and the south, particularly Nuer people, who have been displaced by the oil pipeline and the oil rigs. And I think they would say that a settlement that simply keeps everything in place and has peace would be inadequate, because they've lost their homes and their land, the traditional land.
So the issue of the oil has to be dealt with, the governance system--there are a number of issues that have to be dealt with--the religious questions. But that's for the negotiations. The United States position is that the people to the conflict have to negotiate a settlement, not the United States. We are not going to impose anything on them, because then it ultimately will not hold, it will not work, will not be sustainable.
MODERATOR: Administrator Natsios, fellow briefers, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much.
Read about the USAID Southern Sudan Agriculture Revitalization Project.
Read about USAID's Sudan Basic Education Program.
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Last Updated on: January 02, 2009 |
