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This is an archived USAID document retained on this web site as a matter of public record.
Remarks of J. Brian Atwood, USAID Administrator
May 20, 1998
at the Washington Conference on Global Humanitarian Deminin1g "Post Conflict Transitions: The Landmine Challenge"
Chantilly, VA
Let me begin by thanking Assistant Secretary Rick Inderfurth for his leadership on the landmine issue within the U.S. government and internationally on behalf of our government. Rick has had the benefit of viewing this issue from his previous position at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. He not only understands the devastating impact of landmines on societies transitioning from conflict, he also appreciates the intensity of the international debate on this subject and the sincere passion that drives the advocates of a total ban of this horrible weapon.The international debate over landmines has been more than matched by the debate within our own government. Most of you know this has not been an easy issue for the United States. In the end, the President felt that our own security responsibilities on the Korean peninsula -- our obligation to carry out a United Nations Security Council resolution in a well-defined and protected area -- would not allow us to sign on to the Ottawa protocol banning the use of landmines everywhere.
If anything, this position has caused my government to redouble its efforts to remove landmines placed in the soil of countries emerging from conflict. There is no debate over the devastating consequences of these anti-personnel weapons. There is only horror over the impact on innocent human beings, especially children.
The more we learn about the impact of unexploded mines on the ability of nations to put conflict behind them, the more committed we are to leading an international effort to remove them and to support future efforts to prevent their use.
I would suggest that we examine this issue from the broader perspective of the impact of landmines on the strategies we devise for post-conflict transitions. Negotiations to end conflicts are often concluded on the basis of the minimal conditions the combatants are willing to accept. Peace agreements, as we have seen in recent years including conflicts in such places as Angola, Cambodia, Bosnia and Mozambique, are imperfect but essential frameworks for post-conflict transitions. It is the post-conflict implementation strategy that brings a paper agreement to life and creates the environment for a sustainable peace.
My agency has done a lot of work in post-conflict transitions in the past few years. We have learned a great deal about the factors that impact on the success or failure of the transition. Our Office of Transition Initiatives has done pioneering work in the field and I am a strong advocate of developing a better capacity for this transition mission at the United Nations and among the other donor nations.
Many in this room have had direct experience with the challenges of working in a nation trying to move beyond conflict. These countries move away from conflict and into transition with weak governance structures, few human or financial resources, barely functioning economies, large numbers of former combatants without skills, and continuing needs for external humanitarian assistance. An even more challenging problem is that these restraints are usually set against a backdrop of rising public expectations and immature political leadership -- often former combatants with few civilian leadership skills.
The prospects for success in these transitions is obviously enhanced if the international community adopts a well-defined strategic approach during the period of reconstruction. Such an approach must start with requirements outlined in the peace agreement itself. These agreements have become much more comprehensive lately in addressing the need to respect human rights and to establish democratic institutions including an electoral process that will legitimize a new government. They do not, however, create democratic values, respect for human rights or civil societies that participate knowledgeably in the affairs of society. The development of these essentials takes time, effort and resources.
I would also suggest that the negotiators' handbook for peace agreements be revised to anticipate better the challenge of landmines in the transition. Specifically, we should be seeking agreement from combatants that information be provided on the location of landmines. We should also insist that any existing stockpiles of landmines be publicly destroyed upon the signing of a peace agreement. Such a public act would send the right message to civilians who are the potential or real victims of these weapons.
The first order of business in post-conflict situations is to attempt to mitigate the causes of the original conflict and build confidence that the peace can be sustainable. This usually means inserting peacekeeping forces, demobilizing soldiers, reintegrating them into civilian live, creating alternative media outlets that encourage peace and reconciliation and encouraging people at the community level to work together on small projects that are both vital in returning the society to normal and in demonstrating that people can participate together in deciding on and implementing positive change.
Transitions occur in phases and in each of the identifiable phases of a transition landmines must be considered. In many war-torn countries, we could spend many decades removing mines. This is obviously an expensive proposition and resources that might be needed for other aspects of reconstruction should not be wasted. The first task is to establish priorities that relate to a broader strategy.
Information is essential which is why I strongly support the recommendation of the Survey Contact Group established at the March Ottawa Conference. Last week in Brussels, as I gather you have already heard, this group advocated an initial survey of the scope and impact of landmine contamination. They recommended that common standards be applied to these surveys so that those who must decide which minefields to target are using criteria that can be translated from one country to another.
These "level one general surveys," as the group calls them, should provide the vital information necessary to determine the obstacles to implementing a timed strategic response in a transition. These surveys would be used to identify the areas where landmines must be removed to meet the humanitarian and development goals of the transition strategy.
It is in the first phase of a transition strategy -- the phase where it is crucial to give people the hope that a normal life is possible -- that the landmine issue must be initially addressed. If, for example, civilian populations are isolated and humanitarian relief operations have difficulty distributing food and medicine, this would be a priority area for removal operations.
I would also suggest that a humanitarian priority that relates as much to the reconciliation process as to morality issues is the treatment of landmine victims. Soldiers or civilians who have lost a limb or limbs to landmines are constant reminders of the dehumanization process that makes war seem feasible at the outset. Their families and friends are angry that they have become victims and the victims themselves have a hard time forgetting who did this to them. Modern prosthetics can go a long way in dealing with the physical and psychological problems these wounds cause.
Often resources for treatment are unavailable as this is seen as a purely humanitarian gesture. But we should look more broadly at the strategic implications of treating these victims. Then perhaps we would be more likely to incorporate these resources into the list of basic requirements for a successful transition.
Thanks to Senator Patrick Leahy, a leader in the effort to eradicate landmines, we in the United States have created a War Victims Fund. We have made great strides in establishing prosthetics clinics in many post-conflict societies, including Vietnam.
The second order of business in a transition is reviving economic activity. A feeling of hope for the future and a return to a more normal life -- meaning the absence of war -- must soon be accompanied by meaningful employment, the availability of goods and services, particularly food, and the restoration of normal community services -- schools, electricity and water supply, for example.
The freeing of agricultural land is often a key to economic revitalization in developing societies. The presence, or even the presumed presence of landmines reduces the amount of land that can be farmed and increases the need for food aid. Landmines also hinder the repair of irrigation systems that allow for increased production.
Thus this second stage in a transition strategy may call for placing a priority on agricultural lands. The clearing of large tracts is an expensive proposition, however, a calculation has to be made: if a country remains dependent on external food aid, that is also an expensive proposition; and, if an economy is growing again, national resources will be available to sustain the transition in its later phases.
A third stage may involve a national election wherein maximum participation becomes a key to future acceptance of the government. We have many examples of the complications created by landmines during the phases of an election campaign. It might be necessary to undertake a second level mapping exercise to support the vitality of an electoral process. In other words, we should know exactly how an electoral process would be affected by landmines and attempt to mitigate the most inhibiting factors.
A fourth stage might require a government to extend its presence around the country, particularly into formerly war-torn areas. Landmines could impede the delivery of government services and act as physical obstacles to unity and reconstruction. Mobility is critical to the success of teachers, technicians, extension agents, doctors and other health care workers, and staff of development agencies dealing with post-conflict situations. Using the survey data, priorities should be established that would identify vital areas or vital sectors on which the success of the transition will depend and removal undertaken accordingly.
The fifth stage of a transition might be a consolidation phase. Presumably, a sustainable peace would have been established as people begin to have a stake in the growing economy and the evolving political institutions. Still, as is the case in Mozambique, for example, large areas of the country continue to be non-productive because of landmines. In this stage, the removal effort might be transferred to the government which can tie its own investments in removal to anticipated increased production and economic growth.
What this implies is that technology and knowledge has been transferred to national or local authorities or NGO's during the first part of the transition. Mine removal is not rocket science, but the techniques and organization of these efforts must be taught as the international entities remove mines in the first phases.
In describing five possible stages of a transition, I am painfully aware that situations differ drastically and that various phases often overlap. What is important here is that the analysis is done -- if possible even before a peace agreement is negotiated -- and that a strategy be devised that includes an assessment of the impact of landmines on the key elements of the strategy.
People need security, shelter and food in the earliest phase so they can have hope and confidence in the peace process. Emergency removal in this phase is often undertaken by a peacekeeping force.
Economic revitalization requires open roads, open fields and open access to markets. Decisions are needed as to what landmines most hinder this process.
Political activity and elections are risky business in that parties to a conflict are now asked to compete peacefully. They should not be able to restrict participation of citizens, voters and monitors because of landmines.
New governments need to demonstrate their capacity to help people, deliver goods and services, including health care and education. Landmines cannot be an obstacle to this process.
In each of these stages, priorities need to be established based on solid information about the whereabouts of landmines. In each of these stages, the international community will have to bear the bulk of the costs. In each of these stages, training is essential so that the clearance process can be transferred in the final stage to local officials.
Resolution of the landmine problem must be viewed as an integral element of peace building programs, not as a marginal factor. Priorities for demining should be viewed in terms of the impact on the transition process and on the confidence people have in that process. The better measure of success is not the number of mines removed, but how quickly the civilian population can return to a normal life. This is the surest way to give people a stake in peace.
A sustainable peace is much more than the absence of war. It means that people can live without the constant fear of falling victim to conflict. The most arbitrary victimization of people that exists in societies that experience the ravages of war is the impersonal attack of a weapon buried a foot beneath the ground. Fear cannot be entirely eliminated until these anti-personnel landmines are entirely eliminated. But, until we acquire better technology that makes the removal process more cost-effective, we will be relegated to thinking more strategically, possessing the best information a survey can provide, giving priority to our actions and working with people to create hope, confidence and the internal sense of security that will overcome the fears that remain. Thank you.
This is an archived USAID document retained on this web site as a matter of public record.
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Last Updated on: July 18, 2001 |
