This is an archived USAID document retained on this web site as a matter of public record.
Administrator J. Brian Atwood
Carnegie Face-to-Face
"A Catalyst for Change -- U.S. Leadership in Political and Economic Transitions"
Washington, D.C., April 10, 1997
U.S. Agency for International Development
Good afternoon. I want to thank Tom Carothers for his kind introduction.
And Robin Markowitz for doing such an excellent job with the face-to-face series. It
is always a pleasure to be at a Carnegie Endowment event and to see so many friends
in the audience.
One of the more obvious characteristics of the post-Cold War world is the
proliferation of crises and post-crisis transition situations. I want to share some
thoughts with you today about these transitions and the role our government is playing
in attempting to manage them in partnership with the international community.
USAID has adopted some new and innovative approaches to these difficult challenges
and I want you to be aware of them.
But let me begin with the broader context. The successful transitions from
crisis -- the process of moving an entire society from conflict to enduring peace --
should be seen as part of a strategic framework that includes elements of both crisis
management and crisis prevention.
Our new Secretary of State just may have presented that elusive new paradigm
last year when she suggested that nations today fall generally into four categories: the
industrial democracies that work together to strengthen the international regime; the
emerging democracies and transition states; the rogue states; and the failed or near-failed states.
What is interesting about this construct is that it encourages an analysis of the
characteristics of nations that is very different from the one-dimensional appraisal we
tended to make during the Cold War. Furthermore, this is a dynamic construct for a
much more fluid world scene. What it strongly implies is a goal for U.S. policy that
is very different from containment. It implies an obligation to try to assist countries
to move from the latter three categories into the first.
This of course is not just an American goal. We would use American
leadership to convince others to join the effort.
Yes, we are an indispensable nation, but every one of the industrial
democracies and many of the emerging democracies should see it is in its interest to
move as many of the rogue and failed states as possible into the preferred categories.
If this is to be done, the international community will have to develop a much stronger
institutional capacity to effect this change.
If we are to be successful in influencing the course of weak-states or rogue
states or transitional democracies, I believe we have to share the lessons of crisis
mitigation, crisis prevention and post-crisis transitions. We have spoken at length
about the importance of humanitarian response in conflict situations and the concept of
preventive development and preventive diplomacy. Today I want to share with you
some approaches we have taken at USAID that we would offer as models.
When I came to USAID, we had superb humanitarian relief programs -- fast,
flexible and demand driven. These programs operate with one clear mission: to save
lives. We could also conduct long-term development programs better than most donor
agencies. These efforts supported the lasting structural and policy changes that allow
a nation to achieve sustainable economic and political growth. Sustainable
development programs represent strategic investments. They demand more extended
planning and a results framework. They are implemented over years, not days.
But between relief and development, there was a vacuum, one that the Bush
Administration was struggling to fill, often by trying to bypass USAID, an
organization considered too slow and too apolitical to be helpful. It was conceded that
our institution could deal with famine, as we had done so well in preventing it in
Southern and East Africa. We could deal with restructuring an economy, in the long-term. But we were hard pressed to deal with that awkward space between peace and
war.
We found ourselves poorly positioned to deal with the unique, and often
explicitly political challenges of nations emerging from conflict. For foreign policy-makers this weakness was an Achilles heal in a world where failed states and
sweeping change were everyday realities. I remember Larry Eagleberger telling me
during the transition: "If AID can't deliver that, we need something else."
With that statement and others burning in my mind, in 1993, we suggested a
new mechanism that would bring fast, direct, and overt assistance to priority countries
emerging from conflict. With the support of the Congress, USAID's Office of
Transition Initiatives (OTI) was launched in early 1994 to help countries move beyond
conflict by addressing fundamental needs of emergency rehabilitation and democratic
development. Based within our Bureau for Humanitarian Response, the office was given the special and flexible legal authorities of International Disaster Assistance
funding.
OTI was designed as a lean, flexible operation capable of targeting the key
bottlenecks that keep post-crisis societies from moving forward. We wanted an
operation that was capable of identifying and acting upon the near-term interventions
that provide the momentum for a process of peace and reconciliation.
The office has grown from $9 million in funding in 1995, to $33 million for
1997. The demand for OTI's product obviously has grown within our government as
the office has demonstrated its effectiveness. Today it is a vital tool of American
foreign policy.
I want to publicly acknowledge the role that OTI's director, Rick Barton, has
played in this success. He, Steve Morrison, Johanna Mendelsohn and many others are
chiefly responsible for what OTI has become today.
The challenges of working in a nation trying to move beyond crisis can be
immense. These countries are usually characterized by weak or non-existent
governments with few human or financial resources, barely functioning economies,
large numbers of former combatants without skills, a proliferation of land mines,
human rights abuses, endemic corruption, non-existent political systems and lingering
tension that at any moment can break out into conflict. An even more challenging
problem is that these restraints are usually set against a backdrop of rising public
expectations, immature political leadership and peace settlements that often reflect the
best that could be gotten at the negotiating table rather than the ideal. Taken
collectively, that's a handful.
OTI's flagship program was launched in Haiti in 1994, and it was brought to
conclusion this past month. In Haiti, as in subsequent transitions, we knew we had a
narrow window of opportunity. If the people didn't see an elected government make
an impact quickly, political violence and repression would reemerge.
In nations attempting to put conflict behind them timing is everything. Fragile
situations provide brief opportunities that will pass if not pursued immediately. We
always employ the "do no harm" rule. But we have found that it is better to be 80
percent right and make an impact than too late to make a difference.
In Haiti, we implemented a democratic development effort to foster community
participation in small projects that required the creation of local collaborative groups.
We opened 13 offices around the country and, in two years, supported 2,300 small projects that produced tangible development and political results. Over 600 schools
were built or improved, basic sanitation was provided, and other essentials of life
were delivered -- through the new local elected officials. It was important to give the
government -- at all levels -- the credit and to help make it work to benefit people.
The real impact of our program in Haiti was not to build schools or roads -- it was to
give the Haitian people a stake: in stability, in a political system that served them and
in a collaborative, participatory approach to problem solving.
A complementary program of demobilization and reintegration also kept former
Haitian soldiers engaged in training and out of trouble during this critical stage. Our
goal was to keep the soldiers off the streets and show people in even small villages
that peace would bring direct benefits.
We wanted ultimately to see these soldiers reintegrated into society, but getting
them out of uniform, away from their weapons and into a training center was vital in
the short-term. For the United States, OTI efforts in Haiti helped to define a clear
exit strategy for the U.S. military. We also wanted to accelerate the reconciliation
process and to stabilize the situation before the larger donor effort took hold.
Through this experience and others, we have been able to develop an
opportunistic, "venture capital" model for transitions. This approach values the
influence of early investment at decisive moments that changes the situation on the
ground and effects people's attitudes. In every case, we have tried to design activities
that directly advance high priority U.S. strategic and economic interests while
empowering the citizenry of a country to move toward democratic self rule. And we
have tried to end these programs in less than two years at which point our long-term
development activities could take over.
In Rwanda, OTI provided assistance to the UN Human Rights Field Operation
by providing 200 human rights field officers. We also supported the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. We targeted support for Rwandan women -- who now
comprise approximately 70 percent of the population. We wanted to give them the
resources and capacity to play a significant role in rebuilding their society.
Again, this effort was predicated on pinpointing the most crucial transition
needs: in this case, dealing with the nation's genocide and supporting a political force
-- the women -- that can help move that country beyond conflict.
Part of making our Office of Transitions work well has been an understanding
that some places are not ready for such assistance. In a post-crisis environment it is
essential to have realistic expectations. There are so many transitions. It is easy to over-commit.
Some societies still lack both the security and political will to move beyond
conflict. We send survey missions to these countries and we have often concluded
that the situation was not right. We have come to realize that you cannot go into a
devastated country and hope that holding a quick election will simply make everything
right again. The wounds of war are not so easily healed.
Man-made crises are intricate and require solutions that acknowledge the role of
political forces in both causing and resolving crises. Knowing when the critical line is
crossed -- the demarcation between a compulsion for more conflict and the
commitment to reconcile -- is a political calculation of the first order. Obviously, this
calculation is not made by USAID alone. It is made with all of the intelligence,
diplomatic and analytical capacity our government can bring to bear.
Guatemala offers an excellent example of a country where that calculation was
positive. To support the implementation of the December 1996 Peace Accords, OTI
is assisting with the demobilization plan for the rebel force, the URNG. Specifically,
OTI built the eight camps to be used for the demobilization of the URNG. We are
also providing funding at the camps for training and education programs to facilitate
the URNG's integration into civil society.
Our program is designed to help translate an agreement on paper into a living
and viable peace. In these transition settings, it is important to know your customers.
Programs need to reach people. Our credibility only extends as far as our ability to
deliver on our commitments in a timely fashion. Donor pledging conferences that
commit millions of dollars but are unable to get programs up and running on the
ground do little to create an expectation of peace in the early days of a transition.
In Angola, we have had a transition program to strengthen compliance with the
Lusaka Protocol. OTI planned the demobilization centers that were taken over by UN
peacekeeping forces. Our efforts in Angola and elsewhere have been underpinned by
the notion that security comes first.
Until people feel a degree of safety, they are not ready for political
development. That was certainly a lesson of the first, failed transition in Angola.
The second time around, OTI supported mine awareness and mine removal training;
civic training and demobilization activities for ex-combatants; community self-governance; and, we increased the flow of accurate, uncensored news.
Almost 1,400,000 people have been reached by mine awareness training, and around 750 people have been trained in mine removal techniques. The results: a
significant reduction in mine accidents; the re-opening of large areas of the country to
commerce and agriculture; and, the return of refugees and displaced persons to their
homes. For us, removing mines wasn't the most important part of demining -- getting
people to return to their homes was.
In Bosnia, we were on the ground to offer programmatic support when the
Federation was formed. We subsequently built on that experience to support the
Dayton Accords once they were signed. In Bosnia, OTI programs have directly
targeted the public disinformation campaigns that have fueled ethnic tensions in that
region. OTI set up an office in Banja Luka to help train journalists and disseminate
news that supports reconciliation.
To date, over 271 grants have been made by OTI in Bosnia that have
supported over 170 civic and media groups implementing practical initiatives that
reduce community tensions, cultivate democracy, and promote basic political
freedoms. Mass media civic education activities have been supported through: a
television campaign, alternative print media in Srpska, the establishment of a Media
Law Center in Tuzla and three regional media monitoring organizations.
There is still a long way to go in Bosnia, and larger donor resources are now
flowing. There are many difficult questions still ahead, but OTI was on the ground
early and, if this effort succeeds in keeping the peace, this early contribution will have
made a difference.
The needs of a country emerging from a post-conflict situation are many and a
concerted international response is required. The U.S. cannot do it alone, but we can
get out front and lead. We rebuilt some 2,548 homes in Bosnia in the first year of the
transition. We did it not only because housing was crucial to resettlement, but also
because we wanted to encourage other donors to follow our lead. Now thousands
more houses are being rebuilt by UNHCR and the European Union using the same
techniques we employed.
The menu for transition assistance OTI and AID regional bureaus have
developed is growing and the contribution we make in any given situation is selective.
But consider what we now have the capacity to deliver:
-- The planning and construction of demobilization camps for ex-combatants.
-- The training of ex-combatants for reintegration into a society's peacetime workforce.
-- Small community development programs that encourage political
organization at the local level.
-- The clearing of landmines and mine awareness programs.
-- The provision of alternative media information outlets to encourage peace
and reconciliation.
-- The training of law enforcement officials and judges.
-- The creation of electoral systems and other support for nascent political
systems.
-- Organizational assistance to new governments, both at the national and
local level.
-- Support to human rights monitors and to tribunals or commissions
examining war crimes and other acts of impunity during the conflict.
We have shared this menu and pressed the transition agenda with other donors
on the Development Assistance Committee's Task Force on Peace, Conflict and
Development. We have introduced the concept of a relief-recovery-long-term
development continuum in the context of the President's Greater Horn of Africa
Initiative. And now the transitional link between relief and development is better
understood. We have edited and distributed a book entitled "Rebuilding Societies
After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance."
We have done all in our power to encourage the international organizations to
adopt and institutionalize these lessons learned. The international community needs to
do better. It is past time to institutionalize this capacity within the UN system.
I will be inviting my donor counterparts this week to gather together in
Washington to share information on post-conflict transitions. We will hopefully meet
in advance of the World Bank/IMF meetings later this year. World Bank President
Jim Wolfensohn has agreed to join USAID and other donors in a major conference on
dealing with post-conflict societies at a later date.
We will not only discuss the menu of interventions. We will also consider the
more difficult political and moral dilemmas we face. For example, we are often confronted with parties to an agreement that do not abide by its terms. Do we apply
strict conditionality and cut off assistance? Would this cause a breakdown in the
peace process? Yet excusing violations or ignoring prior criminal acts, war crimes or
even genocide sends distinct messages to the emotionally scarred people of a war-torn
society. And it sends messages far beyond that society as well.
This is why transition programs must be closely aligned with diplomatic
strategies. Separating the two will lead to policy failures.
In many ways, the challenge of the next century will be to maintain our
commitment to long term development and crisis prevention while further developing
the fast and flexible instruments that will allow us to take direct and positive action in
transitions or in situations where crisis is imminent. Perhaps twenty years ago we
might have used the Central Intelligence Agency to take covert actions in these
situations. Maybe in those days of East-West conflict we were capable of using
coercion and brute strength to bring about the desired policy outcome. But the world
has changed.
Today, our challenge is to develop overt mechanisms to quickly advance our
strategic interests and prevent crisis. The overt mechanisms of the 1990s, unlike the
covert efforts of the 1960s, have to be transparent, democratic and able to stand the
test of public scrutiny. Only open programs will gain the international collaboration
and burden-sharing we need. Only open programs have a chance for success.
These are the operational requirements of this new, dynamic paradigm:
diplomacy and development programs working side by side both to prevent crisis, to
transit from crisis, and to produce positive change. Diplomacy and humanitarian
relief to mitigate and resolve crises. Diplomacy and development working together to
move nations from one problematic category of nations to another less problematic
category. And, ultimately, to full partnership in support of a more democratic, more
peaceful international community. Idealistic? Perhaps. But does an indispensable
nations have any other choice?
As Franklin Delano Roosevelt so rightly said: "It is common sense to take a
method and try it. If it fails, admit it and try another. But above all, try something."
It is the uniquely American attitude reflected in this quote rather than just our ideas
and our resources that makes our nation indispensable. Thank you.
This is an archived USAID document retained on this web site as a matter of public record.
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Last Updated on: July 18, 2001
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