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Local Organizations in Development
March 1984
>> This Is USAID >> USAID Policy Papers >> Local Organizations in Development
Executive Summary II. Types of Local Organizations
III. The Role of Local Organizations in USAID's Program
IV. Overcoming Limitations of Local Organizations
Wednesday, 11-Jul-2001 16:50:20 EDT
Limitations on the performance of local organizations derive from several sources, including: (a) the resistance local organizations may generate from other elements of society; (b) the possibility that local organizations wi.11 become subordinated to other more powerful agencies; (c) the presence of socioeconomic and political cleavages within local organizations; and (d) the likelihood that some local organizations will prove ineffective at accomplishing important development tasks.7 These limitations do not pertain to-local organizations alone; no organizational format is entirely free from these ills. Nevertheless. these limitations are discussed here both because (a) these criticisms often are used to justify circumventing local organizations, and (b) because donors and host country governments must understand how such problems emerge if they are to fashion remedial actions. IV. Overcoming Limitations of Local Organizations
A. Resistance
Local organizations come into being and persist because they serve the economic, political, or other needs of th@ir membership or clientele. As "interest groups" they are inevitably in opposition to other economic and political interests; not surprisingly, then, a program to strengthen specific local organizations, or to introduce new ones for specific purposes, may meet with considerable resistance. The main sources of resistance are local and regional elites (who may either be supported or opposed by central authorities), local and regional government administrators, national political leaders, and perhaps even some or all of the general population in the area concerned.
For instance, established traders (sometimes reliant upon government-sanctioned trade restraints) may well oppose marketing cooperatives. Large landowners may not be enthusiastic about farmers' associations. Local administrative officials often regard local private enterprise with distrust and may express concern that proposed business associations will increase price collusion and consumer exploitation. National political leaders may fear local governments or private associations as independent political power bases. Finally, people in general may well resist the introduction of new local organizations if these are perceived as government entities, or if they appear likely to serve the needs of some groups to the exclusion or others. These types of concerns can be expected to emerge in any situation where local organizations are to be strengthened or supported.
If large segments of a population are reluctant to participate in new organizations that are proposed in conjunction with assistance programs, USAID should regard this as a major problem with program objectives or modes of implementation, and should seek to understand the reasons for resistance and modify or eliminate those elements of a program that seem problematic.
B. Subordination
Local organizations, particularly voluntary associations and local government, are often weak in finances and technical skills, have poor access to legal services, and are consequently easily dominated by more powerful outside groups. In these situations local organizations do not act independently, but rather reflect the desires of central government and local elites.
Government influence inevitably grows when local organizations begin competing for and accepting government resources (loans, services, grants, credit guarantees). Along with the resources come reporting responsibilities and the requirement to conform with various regulations; eventually government may reserve the right to appoint or veto the appointment of local organizational officers. Whether and to what extent expanded control will undermine the independence and vitality of local organizations depends on any number of specific local circumstances. There is little that can be done to resist central authorities that are determined to suborn a local entity; even governments and donors wishing to strengthen the role of local organizations, for instance by providing loan or grant funds, may paradoxically weaken or subvert them at the same time. Minimally, USAID should ensure that legislation and regulatory codes spell out and protect an independent role specific categories of local organizations.
Local organizations can be strengthened by providing for regular, well-publicized elections, as well as mandated rotations in and out of office, but probably the best course is to ensure that the membership in general possesses the education and training needed to understand the business and procedures of the organizations, as well as legal requirements. An informed, active, and committed membership is the best defense against subordination of organizations. Hence, in strengthening the role of local organizations in LDCs, USAID will give priority to training and technical assistance in management, administration, and member education.
C. Factionalism 8
Local organizations are also subject to internal cleavages, reflecting differentiation that may be social in nature (castes, religion, ethnicity), economic (large farmers vs. small, traders vs. producers), or some mixture. All generate factionalism and political antagonisms, and all tend to weaken the capacity of local organizations to undertake concerted action with general community support. In other circumstances, underlying community cleavages may generate a multiplicity of local organizations, each with similar objectives but intending to serve the needs of different local groups. Fragmentation of community resources and proliferation of redundant, ineffective small -scale activities are the inevitable result. As with resistance and subordination, there are, however, some concrete steps that can be taken to check factional divisions.
Small, relatively homogeneous groups will be more resistant to factionalism than larger, diverse groups. When the primary units (e.g., primary cooperative societies) are too large and too heterogenous, collective action is discouraged and the organizations often fad. Thus, the tendency to encourage large groups so that overt administrative costs are low frequently leads to weak performance that is ultimately more costly. Another way to guard against excessive factionalism may be to stress consensual, or at least open, decision-making, so that members feel they have had a role in important decisions affecting their organization,
Sometimes organizations that are generating demonstrable benefits are less subject to internal dissent, since all members have a stake in maintaining the organization; but at other times success itself might generate discord as groups vie for control of new resources. Plainly, some discord will always be present, and of itself ought not discourage assistance to local organizations; in fact, internal dissent is one mark of a vital, on-going organization-only moribund entities provide no criticism. Hence USAID should ensure that local organizations we support are appropriately sized, as homogeneous as circumstances will permit, and committed to open decision-making processes.
Factionalism can also be of value, however, when formal organizations are inadequate. Factional politics allows local groups to make their views known nationally, and creates a link between politicians and the administrative officers responsible .for policy implementation. USAID recognizes that factionalism, while often disruptive of immediate project goals, may also contribute to broader developmental objectives by providing the mechanism through which formal organizations may adapt to new and changing demands.
D. Ineffectiveness
Local organizations can often be relatively ineffective at accomplishing essential development tasks, as a result of either internal or external factors. Local governments, for instance, are often weak because their independent authority to generate revenue has been usurped by central authorities, or they may be weak because of inept administrative practices. Farmers' cooperatives may be crippled by national pricing policies that mandate marketing fees at a level below the real cost, or they may suffer from poor business management. Local administrative offices may perform poorly because the incumbents are transferred frequently from post to post, never learning enough about local circumstances to identify problems and solutions dearly, or the poor performance may stem from inadequate technical abilities. Very often, it should be noted, the diagnosis of ineffectiveness differs with the perspective of the observer. If local authorities are performing poorly, for instance, officials in the center might suspect corruption; a management specialist might focus on lack of .accounting skills; and the local authorities themselves might complain of inadequate revenue. The real situation will likely be a complex amalgam of all these, and so A.I D. must consider a wide range of problem areas and possible solutions when considering action to increase the implementation capacity of local organizations.
Problems of ineffectiveness may be addressed in a number of ways. Sometimes (e.g., in primary cooperative societies) the need may be as simple as better bookkeeping skills; other times (e.g., weak local government) national administrative policy reform, which may have to be approached slowly and indirectly, is required. Very often local organizations may be ineffective because they.have poor vertical linkages to central resources (e.g., technical advice and funds in the case of small enterprises). Surprisingly often, ineffectiveness may actually be an outcome of donor assistance, for instance when new organizations are expected to learn to accomplish a number of different tasks simultaneously. Experience has shown that single-function organizations are more successful initially than multi-function organizations; at the same time, continued success and growth is unlikely if an organization fails to expand into new area of activity. Hence in general USAID should plan for new organizations to perform single, simple tasks, but allow for growth over time as experience and capacity increase.
Ineffectiveness in itself is not an argument against enlisting local organizations in development initiatives; they may, in fact, be no more ineffective than alternative national organizations or ad hoc project units, although the reasons for the ineffectiveness may be different. In fact, the effectiveness of both national and local organizations may be improved by combining the complementary inputs of both levels in planned programs of development.
7 This discussion is based on the references listed in Footnote 1 above.
[return to text]8 A comprehensive analysis of factionalism is offered in:
Nicholson, Norman K., 1972 The Factional Model and the Study of Politics. Comparative Political Studies, October, pp. 291-314.
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Last Updated on: July 11, 2001 |
