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Transition Initiatives: Philippines Special Background Report

May 22, 2000


Security Situation

BACKGROUND

It is important to distinguish between the various armed groups that operate on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao to obtain a clear picture of the current security situation. In the 1990s four significant armed groups have operated within Mindanao: 1) Moro National Liberation Front; 2) the Abu Sayyaf; 3) New Peoples Army; and 4) The Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

MNLF

In September 1996, a Peace Agreement between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GOP) was signed. Prior to the signing, the MNLF was considered the largest rebel group actively fighting the GOP armed forces. It is estimated that the MNLF was composed of 40,000 to 60,000 combatants, mostly Muslim, organized into State and National units. The MNLF command and control systems were well developed and continue to operate today. Two facts should be noted about the 1996 peace agreement: 1) the agreement did not call for the disarmament of the MNLF combatants; and 2) the agreement was to create a new autonomous region within Muslim Mindanao. Since late 1997 USAID has implemented programs to support the MNLF-GOP Peace Agreement, with USAID\OTI maintaining a field presence in Mindanao. In working closely with the MNLF leadership since 1997, USAID\OTI does not doubt the MNLF leadership's commitment to implementing the 1996 peace agreement. Through their actions, the MNLF leadership and the vast majority of MNLF former combatants have demonstrated their sincerity to pursue the peace agreement and have embraced the notion of 'Peace and Development'.

ABU SAYYAF

The recent international press coverage of the Abu Sayyaf has confused exactly who the Abu Sayyaf are and to what degree they are supported by the Muslim population of Mindanao. The Abu Sayyaf has been active in Mindanao for approximately 10 years and is considered to be a terrorist organization with links to other key international terrorist organizations. Their base of influence is on the islands of Basilan and Sulu, but seldom penetrated onto the mainland portion of Mindanao. The exact size of the group is not know, but it is estimated to have approximately 200-500 followers. Over the last several years the Abu Sayyaf has specialized in kidnapping for ransom of local Chinese Filipino businessmen. This year two groups of hostages were kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf. The first group was a group of school children and teachers (one a priest) taken in March. The second group was the highly publicized group of tourist from the Malaysian Island resort. The Abu Sayyaf have proven their ability to show no mercy to their kidnapped hostage, e.g. the beheading of two of the adults (one the priest) from the school group and mutilation of two other female captives. This group does not receive the support of most Muslims of Mindanao and even the former Libyan Ambassador assisting with the negotiated release of the foreign hostages has commented that the brutal actions of the Abu Sayyaf are "un-Islamic".

NPA

The communist New Peoples Army (NPA) are the leftist rebels who still remain active in portions of Mindanao. The exact strength of the organization is unknown, but its numbers are expected to be significantly reduced from the 1980's. On February 24, 1999 President Estrada suspended ongoing peace talks with the NPA due to the kidnapping of Armed Forces of the Philippine (AFP) Brig. General Obillo 50 kilometers outside of Davao City. Late in 1999, the AFP claimed that the MILF and NPA had forged an alliance to join forces against the AFP. It is not confirmed if this alliance exists.

MILF

With the 1996 peace agreement signed between the MNLF and GOP, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) became the largest (approximately 10,000 to 20,000 combatants) Muslim rebel movement in Mindanao. Unlike the MNLF, the MILF continued to stand firm on their position calling for an independent rather than an autonomous Muslim Mindanao. In January 1997, the GOP and the MILF opened formal talks in a bid to create a comprehensive peace in Mindanao. Throughout 1997 the Ramos administration pursued peace negotiations with the MILF in hopes that an agreement could be reached before the end of Ramos's term as President. By October 1997, the MILF and the GOP signed a formal cease-fire agreement, which called for both sides to stop executions, kidnappings, bombings, raids, attacks and similar acts. From 1996 to 1999 little progress was made to start official peace talks between the MILF and GOP. It appeared the MILF were content with observing the GOP's implementation of the 1996 MNLF-GOP Peace Agreement before finalizing their negotiating strategy. The following is a timeline of significant security events following the signing of the October 1997 cease-fire to May 2000:

  • October 1997, cease-fire signed MILF and GOP.
  • January and February 1998, several dozen members of both the MILF and AFP were killed in skirmishes within municipality of Datu Piang, Maguindanao Province.
  • March to August 1998, the May Presidential elections brought an official suspension of MILF-GOP talks until the new Presidential team is put in place.
  • December 1998 through February 1999, a new more serious round of fighting took place between MILF and AFP in Maguindanao and North Cotabato Provinces.
  • March until October 1999, the cease-fire stable with only minor encounters being reported.
  • May until October 1999, the launching of formal peace negotiations delayed several times. During this period the Congress was debating the date of the next ARMM election and legislation to allow the holding of a plebiscite to determine the new Autonomous Region.
  • October 25, 1999, the official negotiations commenced. Philippine President Estrada imposed a June 30, 2000 deadline for the Peace Panel to negotiate a final agreement. He states if the agreement is not completed by the deadline, the full force of the GOP would be brought to bear on the MILF.
  • November 1999, several encounters in Carmen and M'lang municipalities, North Cotabato between MILF and AFP when MILF attempt to claim new camps.
  • January 2000, AFP proposes to mobilize 35,000 men as Civilian Armed Forces Geographic Unit personnel to help fight the secessionist and communist rebels.
  • January 2000, AFP begin challenging various MILF claims to official camps in Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. This involves the shrinking of cease-fire buffer zones between AFP and MILF forces.
  • Late January to early February 2000, AFP clear MILF Camp Omar near Talayan, Maguindanao. Camp Omar located near main highway from Cotabato City to General Santos.
  • February 2000, AFP actions on Camp Omar spawn several additional skirmishes in North Cotabato and Maguindanao between AFP and MILF.
  • At the end of February, the MILF exploded 3 bombs in 3 cities in Mindanao, one killing over 30 civilians.
  • March 2000, the confrontations shift north from the provinces of North Cotabato and Maguindanao to the Province of Lanao del Norte. AFP challenge MILF's claim of a camp in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. By mid-March the MILF attack the municipality of Kauswagan resulting in the MILF briefly (less than 24 hours) capturing the Kauswagan Municipal Hall. The AFP immediately deployed reinforcements to the Lanao Provinces and engaged the MILF. AFP pursuit operations included air and artillery bombardment and numerous encounters in the rural areas of several municipalities.
  • By the end of March the AFP and MILF fighting concentrated in three municipalities: Munai, Matungao, and Balo-i. By the second week of April the known MILF camps in Kauswagan, Balo-I, and Munai were overrun by the AFP.
  • End of April, AFP launched a new offensive to clear MILF check-points along the Narciso Ramos highway between Cotabato City and Malabang, Maguindanao.  The check-points targeted by the AFP have existed for years and run along the western boundary of Camp Abubakar, the main camp of the MILF.  Intense fighting occurred in Parang, Buldon, and Matanog.
  • April 30, 2000 MILF Chairman Murad unilaterally signs a Suspension of the Peace Talks memo.
  • May 5-7, 2000 MILF launched a series of bombings scattered throughout Mindanao, e.g. Butuan City (1), Surigao City (2), Mati (4), Davao City (2), General Santos (1), Pagadian City (2), Zamboanga (2).  According to MILF this was in direct response to the AFP operations against Camp Abubakar. It cannot be confirmed if all the bombings that took place over the weekend of May 5-7 could all be attributed to the MILF.
  • May 7-22, 2000, a half dozen additional bombs exploded in smaller municipalities in North Cotabato and two in metro Manila. It is difficult to determine the responsible parties for all bombings. It appears that several of the attacks are the work of other non-MILF groups who were taking advantage of the situation.
  • On May 15, 2000 MILF Leader Murad announced that the MILF would pull back all their forces one kilometer from the Narciso Ramos National Highway north of Cotabato City, effective 6 p.m. that evening.  The gesture was to set the stage for the Government to return to the negotiation table and end its offensive along the Narciso Ramos highway and attacks on Camp Abubakar.
  • May 20, 2000, military shelling and troop movements along the highway and toward Camp Abubakar stop.
  • May 20, 2000, tension around municipality of Buldon growing due to new AFP troop movements along Parang to Buldon road.
  • May 22, 2000 MILF announce pull back of MILF troops to Camp Abubakar from Parang to Buldon road effective 6 p.m.

MINDANAO PEACE PROCESS

NEGATIVE IMPACT

The deterioration of the security situation has had a direct negative impact on the population of Mindanao. The following will try and capture the general mood:

  1. Most common statement heard from the average Mindanaon citizen is "I am tired of this, we need to end it once and for all". Euphemism for pursuing a military solution to the problem.
  2. The bombings have caused growing mistrust and polarization to build between Muslim and Christian communities. This mistrust provides fertile ground for radicalization of a population.
  3. Growing signs that vigilante groups are reemerging within the Christian community. Specific examples already exist where vigilante groups have claimed responsibility for the bombing of a mosque in Davao and another group in General Santos City has published a letter calling for a Muslim Free Mindanao.
  4. Little or no differentiation is being made between the various Muslim populations living in Mindanao. The popular press, media and government officials have failed to draw a distinction between the supporters of the minority MILF and Abu Sayyaf groups and the majority of the five million Muslims in Mindanao that are simple civilians or supporters of the MNLF who are actively pursuing the 1996 peace.
  5. United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has issued an evacuation report stating as of May 8, 2000 the fighting in Mindanao had caused 145,733 persons to be relocated to evacuation centers and another 50,000 people to be dislocated by the fighting.

It is clear that the cultural differences that exist between the Christian and Muslim populations of Mindanao are still creating tension. Whether the tension created by these differences will be used to manipulate the majority population against the minority will be determined over the course of the next few months. It is hoped that social fabric of peace within the population of Mindanao can withstand this test.

POSITIVE ACTIVITIES

  1. Over the last two weeks an infant movement of civil society groups in Mindanao (e.g. Bishops and Ulamas Forum, Mindanao Council of Women Leaders, Davao United Peoples' Movement for Peace, etc) have begun to mobilize and promote a return to a negotiated settlement.
  2. Mindanao based politicians have increased the call for local government representatives to be placed on the Peace Panel.
  3. In March the AFP violated the protocols established in the 1996 Peace Agreement for identifying and recognizing Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) areas of control, when they attacked Kauswagan. With the intervention of the UNDP, the MNLF and AFP have established a team to work to prevent this issue from reoccurring. However, as recently as May 16 an encounter took place in the municipality of Matanog, Maguindanao where AFP units attacked a group of MNLF civilians and former combatants. During the two-hour gun battle, two AFP soldiers were killed. The AFP later apologized for wrongfully attacking the MNLF site.
  4. Over the last three months, senior MNLF officials have demonstrated a great deal of restraint and leadership in actively campaigning to promote the 1996 Peace Agreement. All statements from the MNLF leadership have been consistent in attempting to assure the people of the Philippines of the MNLF's continued commitment to the peace process despite the ongoing fighting between the GOP and MILF and Abu Sayyaf. On May 19 and 20 the Consultative Assembly established under the 1996 Peace Agreement met and issued a joint statement calling for the MILF and the GOP to return to the negotiation table. Senior MNLF officials have conducted meetings with MNLF combatant groups, as well as Christian and Lumad communities, to emphasis the MNLF's neutrality.
  5. SPCPD Executive Director Uttoh Salem Cutan stated during a phone conversation on May 22, 2000 that the MNLF want to remain on the path of peace. He stated that the following three actions by the GOP would provide the confidence building measure to assist the MNLF in their efforts: 1) The GOP should expedite the implementation of social and economic development programs for MNLF groups. 2) That the GOP should fully implement the sections of the Peace Agreement calling for the creation of a new Autonomous Region in Mindanao. and 3) The GOP should follow the protocols established under the Peace Agreement and respect the identified MNLF camps and Peace and Development Centers established since the signing of the Peace Agreement.

The destabilizing affects of bias and misunderstanding are eroding trust and confidence between the Muslim and Christian groups. This atmosphere of distrust has the potential of giving way to a return of vigilante abuse of citizens. This can lead to enhanced Muslim and Christian extremism. If the GOP allow the MILF and AFP fighting to destabilize the Mindanao society to this degree, it is logical to believe that one of the casualties of the conflict will be the 1996 Peace Agreement and the discrediting of the existing MNLF Leadership structure. If this happens, two options for future generations of Muslim fighters will be to: 1) join a Fundamentalist MILF force seeking an independent Mindanao; or 2) join terrorist Abu Sayyaf or other future movements. The warrior culture is alive and well in many Muslim families.

ACTIONS

  1. Support civil society groups calling for a return to the negotiation table by the MILF and the GOP (e.g. Bishops and Ulamas Forum, Mindanao Council of Women Leaders, Davao United Peoples' Movement for Peace, etc). Using OTI's small Transition Assistance Grants (TAGs), USAID can support these groups by funding materials for peace campaigns, rallies, forums (e.g., cover cost of posters, handouts, advertisement space, venues and other materials).
  2. Request Department of Agriculture Secretary Angara to fast track the Department of Agriculture's delivery of equipment approved under the DA-SWIFT Village Partnership program that targets rural MNLF villages with tangible agricultural machinery. As of today, 78 proposals benefiting 3,075 former MNLF combatants and 4,205 families are awaiting Department of Agriculture delivery of equipment. This will be the most dramatic evidence the GOP can provide that they have not forgotten the 1996 Peace Agreement.
  3. Encourage political leaders at all levels to support a negotiated peace and to end the use of belligerent language designed to divide the Christian and Muslim communities.

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