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USAID/OTI Philippines Program Summary: FY1999
Country Context: After years at the negotiating table, on
September 2, 1996, the Government of the Republic Philippines (GRP)
and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the largest Muslim
rebel group at the time, signed a peace agreement ending
hostilities. The Peace Agreement was seen as a mechanism for
creating the stability needed for the Southern Philippines
(Mindanao) to begin fulfilling its potential as the new economic
engine of the Philippines. It was thought that if the GRP could
deliver the promised tangible socio-economic assistance to MNLF
groups, it would galvanize the peace agreement for the MNLF, and
that other skeptical Muslim separatist groups would join in signing
a comprehensive peace agreement. If, however, the GRP did not
deliver on its promises, the support for the other more radical
Muslim separatist groups might be strengthened and lead to an
expansion of conflict. Without peace, the economic development of
Mindanao, and the Philippines, will continue to be hampered. In
October of 1999, the second largest Muslim rebel group, the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), opened peace negotiations with the
GRP following nearly 18 months of on-again, off-again cease fires.
U.S. Foreign Policy Interests: With the
end of the U.S. military presence, U.S.-Philippines relations have
improved, focusing on economic and commercial ties while maintaining
the importance of security. Philippines domestic political stability
has resulted in increased U.S. investment in the country. Two-way
U.S. trade with the Philippines amounted to over $16.7 billion in
1997. U.S. investment in the Philippines is estimated at $2.5
billion, slightly more than 29% of all foreign investment in the
Philippines.
OTI Role: In June 1997, at the request
of the USAID Mission, OTI sent an assessment team to determine the
immediate needs of MNLF communities. The USAID Mission was
implementing several economic and governance activities in Mindanao,
but recognized that it needed a more targeted program to reach the
former combatant communities. OTI has assigned a senior
representative to Mindanao, responsible for managing three regional
offices that provide village based projects to MNLF groups. OTI has
also provided technical guidance to the USAID Mission in developing
its follow-on MNLF program.
Focus: The goal of the OTI program in
the Philippines is to provide tangible evidence to the Muslim
communities and the estimated 40,000 ex-combatants that the GRP is
delivering on the 1996 Peace Agreement. The OTI program has had two
Phases that have focused on:
- Enhancing the MNLF ex-combatants and their family's
livelihood.
- Building the basic human resource capacity of the MNLF
village groups (e.g. how to manage a micro-business, how to keep
transparent records).
- Providing tangible evidence that the GRP is delivering
needed services to the Muslim community.
- Developing a hand-off strategy that sustains OTI efforts,
yet fully integrates the GRP within the strategy.
Phase I, from August 1997 to March 1999: The Emergency
Livelihood Assistance Program (ELAP) assisted 4,000 MNLF
ex-combatants, their families and survivors to reintegrate into the
civilian economy by providing immediate agricultural livelihood
assistance and initiating a pilot "literacy for enterprise
development" program for 600 ex-combatants. The agriculture
production component of the ELAP program was implemented by
USAID's Growth with Equity program in Mindanao and provided
corn seeds and seaweed planting materials and technical assistance
to the MNLF community. The functional literacy program was
implemented by World Education and four Philippine NGOs.
Phase II, April 1999 to October 2000: The Support With
Implementing Fast Transition program (SWIFT) will provide 300 MNLF
villages and 9,000 families with village-based micro-infrastructure
projects, post-harvest machinery , and capacity building activities
to assist the target villages in becoming more productive and
profitable. SWIFT works to facilitate tangible linkages between all
levels of the Philippine Government and the MNLF ex-combatant groups
by forging village project agreements that require counterpart
matching from each. Each village project promotes self-help concepts
and enhances the agricultural economic and social well being of the
MNLF ex-combatants, their families, and other members of their
community. SWIFT has become known as the "Arms to Farms"
program.
OTI will consider its 1999 SWIFT program in Mindanao fully
successful if, by December 31, 1999, it has:
- Mobilized GRP and MNLF group counterpart funding that
represents fifty percent of the total cost of each village
project;
- Approved 115 village projects that assist at least 3,450
families;
- Delivered the approved assistance to 80 villages; and,
- Created a dialog between local, provincial, and national
government officials and the rural MNLF village groups in all
operational areas.
PROCESS INDICATORS
Speed: Phase II began in April 1999,
with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with the GRP.
SWIFT administrative, operation, and staff systems were established
by mid May and field staff deployed to their assigned MNLF areas by
May 15. The first village grant was issued in June and by December,
130 village projects assisting 8,288 families and 5,635
ex-combatants have been approved. The total cost of the 130 village
projects was $715,864 with $358,586 (50%) being provided by the GRP
and MNLF village groups.
Targeting: One of the root causes of the
conflict was the inability of the GRP to deliver basic government
services to the Muslim communities in Mindanao. It was recognized in
the beginning of 1999, that the GRP would have to be more actively
involved in delivering assistance to MNLF areas in order for the
Muslim community to begin changing its perception that the GRP was
not (in good faith) implementing the 1996 Peace Agreement.
SWIFT's primary goal is to use tangible village projects to
facilitate positive and meaningful interactions between the rural
Muslim communities supporting the peace process and local,
provincial, and national GRP officials. In order for perceptions to
change, GRP officials will have to visit targeted Muslim villages
and deliver needed projects. SWIFT was designed to facilitate this
basic yet critical government service. To effectively demonstrate to
the Muslim community that the GRP is sincere in pursuing peace, GRP
agencies will have to provide matching funds for each of the SWIFT
projects. If this does not transpire, the program will only serve to
reinforce the image that the international donors care more about
the Muslim community than the Philippine government.
Resource Leveraging: For Phase I --
ELAP:
- FY 1997 to 1998: OTI's contribution was $2.1 million. The
USAID Mission contributed $1.7 million to assist 4,000 MNLF
ex-combatants.
- 1997 British Government provided
$200,000 to assist 300 MNLF ex-combatants.
- FY1999 to 2000: The USAID Mission provided $4.7million for
expanding the ELAP program to assist an additional 7,000 MNLF
ex-combatants by October 2001.
For Phase II -- SWIFT:
- In 1999 OTI provided $500,000 as
leverage capital to draw in GRP and MNLF village group resources
to implement priority village projects. Of the 130 village
projects approved in 1999, the following counterpart was
provided: OTI - $357,278 (50%), GRP - $215,151 (30%), MNLF
village groups - $143,435 (20%)
- Due to the success of reaching into the
unserved rural MNLF villages, in November 1999 OTI finalized
negotiations with the Philippine Department of Agriculture (DA)
to create the DA-SWIFT Village Partnership fund valued at
$575,000. The DA funding will be used as direct counterpart
matching for SWIFT developed village projects.
- The SWIFT program has worked closely with the UNDP, FAO,
World Bank Social Fund, and Canadian Government, which has lead
to USAID demonstrating that counterpart leveraging can be
successfully obtained in a timely way. No other donor program
has required GRP and MNLF groups to provide counterpart. Several
are now looking at redesigning their programs to require
counterpart matching.Through, direct and indirect linkages,
twenty-two percent of SWIFT-funded village projects have built
on previously delivered donor programs to ensure a more
sustainable village group.
Advancing Change: In 1999 the following
results were accomplished:
- 130 village projects were approved and
76 delivered. These projects fell in four categories:
Agriculture Production Machinery (22 projects), Post-Harvest
Machinery and Facilities (94 projects), Village Infrastructure
Improvements (12 projects), Capacity Building (2 projects).
- 5,635 ex-combatants benefited and
assisted in designing and implementing the village projects.
- 8,288 rural families have directly
benefited from the village projects.
- 57 municipalities within seven
Provinces received village projects.
- 650 individuals from ex-combatant
families have completed the second level of functional literacy
training through the pilot literacy program. Due to the high
demand for literacy training the local NGO partners have trained
an additional 100 learners using their own resources.
- 100% of the village projects had some
form of municipal, provincial, or national government support.
- The involvement of all members of an
MNLF village group in designing a given village project has lead
to a growing appreciation that each project is to assist all
members of the group and not just one or two individuals. By
requiring the group to provide real counterpart they have also
begun making the shift from feeling they are owed an entitlement
based on the peace agreement to believing in self-help and group
ownership of their future.
- During the design of SWIFT the MNLF
leaders expressed significant skepticism about SWIFT's
requirement to have three partners (MNLF group, GRP, and SWIFT)
for each village project. By the end of 1999, the results of
implementation, was causing the MNLF leaders to question their
long-term assumption that to involve the government will only
lead to delay and false promises.
Broader Results and Lessons Learned
Overall Country Context: At the
municipal and provincial level progress has been made in achieving
support for MNLF villages. Three of the seven provincial governors
have provided tangible support to the program in 1999. The
implementation of the SWIFT Village Partnership will further
demonstrate the National governments support. A number of MNLF
village partners are requesting MILF units to not pass through their
area, allowing some of these MNLF villages to become real
"Zones of Peace."
Lessons Learned: The capacity building
assistance provided by SWIFT is a critical component of the program,
and many of the village groups will require additional follow-up
training to continue managing the assets they have been provided.
Technical training is also needed to ensure that the machinery
provided is properly operated and maintained.
It was assumed in the program design that by targeting village
groups the group would include both men and women. However, due to
cultural issues the village projects have been predominantly
controlled by men. By the end of 1999, SWIFT began developing
women-specific village based projects.
PARTNERSHIPS
Within the USG: The relationship with
the USAID Mission allowed for the Mission to continue funding the
ELAP program and the development, approval and deployment of
OTI's SWIFT program in 1999. The U.S. Department of
Agriculture provided assistance in opening discussions with the
Philippine Department of Agriculture.
Local partnerships:
- National Line-Agency Departments: The
primary partner has been the Department of Agriculture. The
DA-SWIFT Village Partnership represents only the fourth GRP
project that directly targets MNLF ex-combatants and involves
substantial GRP line-agency support.
- Provincial Government: Developing close
working relationships with the Provincial Governors has improved
the involvement of provincial government offices in SWIFT
activities and is anticipated to lead to future support to
unreached MNLF villages.
- Municipal Government: The Municipal
officials are critical in sustaining relationships established
during the implementation of the SWIFT program. They are in the
best position to promote stability and development.
- Village Groups. The ultimate sustainability of the program
will be based on the MNLF village groups ability to manage the
assets provided under this program. Each village project is
designed to be a self contained activity that if managed
reasonably well can continue to provide critical resources to
the village group to use to further develop their village and
well being.
FUTURE PROSPECTS and EXIT STRATEGY
Planned Adjustments: Targets will be
upwardly adjusted for 2000; it is expected that by October 2000, 380
villages will be assisted, benefiting 20,000 families and 12,000
ex-combatants. Counterpart matching will include SWIFT (40%), GRP
(47%), Village Groups (14%).
Exit Strategy: In September 2000 the
MNLF-GRP Peace Agreement will celebrate its fourth anniversary and
OTI will have conducted operations in Mindanao for almost three
years. In March 1999 the USAID Mission took over full funding of the
Emergency Livelihood Assistance Program. OTI designed the SWIFT
program with a timeframe of 18 months. By October 2000, OTI's
involvement in the Philippines will phase out. The program will
leave behind village groups that have the capacity to manage the
assets provide to them and serve as role models for other Muslim
groups in their area. It is hoped that the relationships facilitated
by SWIFT with municipal, provincial and national government
officials will be sustained. The Department of Agriculture has
approached the USAID Mission to begin discussion of extending the
DA-SWIFT Village Partnership through 2001.
HIGHLIGHTS
- Governor Candao of the Province of
Maguindanao accompanied USAID Mission Director Patricia Buckles
to two OTI village delivery ceremonies. During his speech to the
MNLF group the Governor stated that "he was embarrassed
that the staff of a foreign donor had to be the one to introduce
him for the first time to a village within his constituency.
That he sees this as a challenge to all local government
officials that they provide better leadership." Within one
month of the governor's visit to the village,
infrastructure repairs were funded by the Governor.
- SWIFT Field Officer visited a village to inspect the
recently constructed equipment storage shed and newly purchased
rice tillers. During a discussion with the MNLF Commander from
the village, it was revealed that the group had recently held a
meeting to decide whether they would provide the in-kind
contribution they had pledged for the project, equipment storage
shed and two rice tillers. The finally decided to sell several
guns to buy their contribution since they had no other cash
resources. Although guns are the most important possession of
these ex-combatants, they decided to sell them to live up to
their pledge.
- The speed and flexibility embodied in OTI's SWIFT
mechanism has allowed the SWIFT field staff to obtain
credibility among village groups and local government officials
alike.
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