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USAID Responds to the Hurricane Stan Disaster
Impact of the Disaster
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Description
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Totals as of October 12
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Totals as of October 18
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Totals as of October 27
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Dead
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654
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664
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669
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Missing
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577
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844
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844
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Wounded/hurt
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99
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383
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386
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Directly affected
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205,769
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390,187
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474,928
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Persons living in temporary shelters
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120,475
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108,183
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76,212
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Homes debilitated
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5,501
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24,545
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25,832
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Homes destroyed
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1,711
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8,595
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9,136
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Communities affected
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671
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953
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1,158
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Temporary shelter in existing buildings
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464
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647
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296
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Persons directly and indirectly affected
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3.5 million
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3.5 million
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3.5 million
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Source: CONRED: Government of Guatemala National Council for Disaster Reduction, official verified data.
Damage Assessment and Implications
On October 4, Hurricane Stan made landfall in Mexico and generated separate tropical storms across southern Mexico and Central America. Stan spawned torrential rains that lasted for over five days causing widespread and severe flooding and deadly mudslides.
On October 5, the Government of Guatemala (GoG) declared a national disaster and U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala, James M. Derham followed suit by issuing a disaster declaration due to the magnitude of the damage. On October 7, the GoG officially requested assistance from the international community. President Oscar Berger called for three days of mourning.
As of October 12, according to government reports, floods had killed an estimated 2,000 across Mexico and Central America. The highest death toll has been in Guatemala, which suffered more than 900 landslides, some that buried entire villages. Most of the dead are believed to be concentrated in the most populated highland regions of Guatemala. Half of the country was hit hard: Fifteen of the 22 provinces in both the northwest highlands and southern coastal areas of the country are severely affected. The highland provinces generally have higher poverty and malnutrition rates prior to the disaster, rendering these communities especially vulnerable during the relief and recovery phases. According to the GoG National Council for Disaster Reduction (CONRED), the most affected in terms of damage to infrastructure and land are: affected are: Chimaltenango, Chiquimula, El Quiché, Escuintla, Huehuetenango, Guatemala, Quetzaltenango, Retalhuleu, Sacatepéquez, San Marcos, Santa Rosa, Sololá, and Suchitépquez. Local officials and CONRED report that, of these, San Marcos is the worst affected. These numbers will rise as communication and access to areas that have been cut off by the storm are reached by rescue and relief teams.
At least a third of the national territory (about 36,000 square kilometers - larger than the size of El Salvador) is affected, with varying levels of damage to housing and public infrastructure reported in 251 of 331 municipalities. Stan hit the most productive and populated areas of the South Coast and the Central-Western highlands. The Government of Guatemala (GoG) currently estimates that 3.5 million Guatemalans (30% of total population) have suffered either loss of life, property or access to basic services. Poor and marginalized groups -- particularly indigenous women and children -- that typically lack access to basic services are particularly vulnerable to the impact of the disaster. Reports of hepatitis A and cholera cases caused by contaminated water are already being received from affected communities as well as outbursts of violence in crowded temporary shelters.
The impact on Guatemala's infrastructure and economy is daunting: roads, bridges, telecommunications, and energy infrastructure has been destroyed leaving many communities out of touch and unreachable by disaster relief teams. The Ministry of Education reports that 485 schools were damaged or totally destroyed. The initial assessment of losses estimated by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Non-Traditional Export Products Association (AGEXPRONT) is upwards of U.S.$530 million for the short to medium term, including the near complete loss of bananas and shrimp grown on the South Coast, and major losses in cattle, sugar crop, horticulture, and short cycle crops. This implies immediate loss of revenue and unemployment on a grand scale, both in the directly affected areas and indirectly affected areas that are the source of migrant workers. The damage assessment of farm to market roads is pending. There are also immediate and significant losses in the tourism infrastructure in the towns around Lake Atitlán, Sololá and Quetzaltenango.
Preliminary reports are that infrastructure and economic damage will exceed $1 billion. This will impact on the national economy and hence, all Central American economies because Guatemala's population and economy are the largest in the region. Poverty and unemployment, already serious deterrents to progress, will be greatly exacerbated and illegal immigration is likely to increase due to the disaster. Significant increases in malnutrition, disease and destitution are likely unless immediate measures to alleviate the disaster's impact are implemented. The Government will be hard-pressed to respond comprehensively due to its already limited capacity and lack of resources.
Relief
The USAID/OFDA assessment team reports that top priorities are health, water and sanitation, and shelter. The U.N. Joint Flash Appeal for $21.6 million (October 10, 2005) highlighted the need for food, water, temporary shelter, bedding, essential medicines, and hygiene and sanitation facilities, as well as repair of public infrastructure.
A six-person USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) team has been on the ground working with USAID/Guatemala, CONRED and USAID partner NGOs to assess impacts, identify specific needs, and deliver emergency assistance. A coordinating group with international and national NGO partners has been formed and works with a rotating CONRED representative to provide relief and plans rehabilitation and reconstruction activities needed over the next six months with USAID/OFDA and USAID/Guatemala funding. NGO members include but are not limited to: CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Mercy Corps, Red Cross International, Save the Children and SHARE/Guatemala.
On October 10, General Craddock, head of U.S. military Southern Command came to Guatemala and committed to keep nine U.S. military helicopters working on emergency relief activities and to bring in transport planes and more equipment, as well continue search and rescue efforts to relief, supply, and technical assessments. Between October 11 and 17, the team had delivered 161 tons of food, medical supplies and communications equipment, evacuated 41 people, and has flown Guatemalan firefighters, aid workers and doctors to communities in need. USAID/OFDA, USAID/Guatemala and U.S. military coordinate closely with CONRED for transport and distribution of relief commodities to affected communities.
Immediate emergency relief efforts were seriously hampered by ongoing rain and low cloud cover. Many remote communities have been cut off by damaged roads, telecommunications, swollen rivers and mudslides. Helicopters have been essential in working to get supplies to these communities.
Soon after a disaster strikes, efforts quickly shift from emergency relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction. Efforts move from distributing medicines, water, food, hygiene and temporary shelter to urgent work on infrastructure such as re-opening mountain roads; repairing and rebuilding bridges; buildings and houses; economic rehabilitation; health; and food security issues.
USAID Humanitarian Assistance to Date
| Date |
Assistance Description
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USD Total
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| New Funds |
| 5/Oct/05 |
Local purchase and distribution of emergency relief supplies (food and potable water) and helicopter support (fuel).
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$150,000
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| 7,8 and 13/Oct/05 |
Airlifts one, two, and three with hygiene kits, nylon sheeting for temporary shelters, and blankets and air transport of emergency relief supplies
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$790,000
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| 12/Oct/05 |
Emergency grants to NGO partners for emergency health, water and sanitation and shelter.
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$3 million
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| 12/Oct/05 |
Emergency health, water and sanitation, and shelter activities in response to U.N. Flash Appeal
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$200,000
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| 17/Oct/05 |
USAID donation to U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) - in response to U.N. Flash Appeal
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$2 million
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| 14/Nov/05 |
USAID donation to U.N. World Food Programme (WFP)
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$2 million
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| 18/Nov/05 |
Nylon sheeting for temporary shelters (500 rolls)
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$189,895
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| Sub-Total (New Funds) |
8,329,895 |
| Reprogrammed Funds
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| 17/Oct/05 |
Reprogrammed funds from existing USAID/Guatemala food security programs
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$1 million
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| 17/Oct/05 - Nov/05 |
Reprogrammed funds from existing USAID/Guatemala health programs (ground transportation for disaster relief and $1 million in USAID alliance funds that are leveraging 5x more in local private sector donations for disaster relief/reconstruction)
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$1,100,000
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| Sub-Total (Reprogrammed Funds) |
2,100,00 |
| Total USAID Assistance |
$10,429,895 |
US Military Assistance:
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Operations
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$4 million
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Jet Fuel
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594,000
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Donation of ambulances, fire trucks, construction equipment
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1,058,000
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Total Military Assistance
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5,652,000
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Inter-American Foundation (IAF):
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Grants to local NGOs (planned)
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748,497
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Animal and Plant Health Service (APHIS):
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Equipment for veterinarians working on sanitary brigades
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5,000
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Total USG Assistance (to date)
Updated 11/16/2005
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$16,835,392
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Reconstruction
The impact of the economic damage and loss is particularly acute for this country of 12 million people and $25 million economy. As its government and people move from relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction, the required assistance will clearly go beyond the immediate-term. The GoG is working on a rehabilitation plan and will present it to the international community in early November. Meanwhile, USAID/Guatemala is basing a Phase Two recovery and reconstruction proposal on the initial assessments of damage to the country's infrastructure and economy and estimates for reconstruction needs as provided above; these will be adjusted once the GoG's plan is available.
Recovery costs will be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. The rehabilitation work that will be required will put great pressure on an administration already strapped for resources. USAID will work to help ensure that important advances that have been made over the last three years, particularly in the social sectors, will not be lost and will contribute additional needed resources to recover to pre-Stan levels. Prior to Hurricane Stan (per 2002 data), Guatemala's population living in poverty was 54.3 percent and in extreme poverty, 21.5 percent. In the rural areas, poverty was as high as 82 percent. Guatemala has the highest fertility rate and the highest rate of stunting in the region. More than two million children between ages five and 18 do not attend school.
Press Releases and Fact Sheets
USAID Disaster Assistance: Guatemala - Flood Index
10/06/05 - The U.S. Government Donates Assistance and Provides Helicopters for Emergency Relief - U.S. Embassy Guatemala
Continuing U.S. Government Assistance To Emergency Relief Efforts in Guatemala
10/10/05 - General Craddock Visits Guatemala, Commits Further U.S. Assistance - U.S. Embassy Guatemala
Public Donation Information
The most effective way people can assist relief efforts is by making cash contributions to humanitarian organizations that are conducting relief operations.
USAID encourages cash donations because they:
- allow aid professionals to procure the exact items needed (often in the affected region);
- can be transferred very quickly and without transportation costs;
- support the economy of the disaster-stricken region; and,
- ensure culturally, dietary, and environmentally appropriate assistance.
More information on making donations and volunteering can be found at:
USAID: www.usaid.gov - Keyword: Donations
The Center for International Disaster Information: www.cidi.org or (703) 276-1914
Disaster Myths and Realities
From: Eberwine, Donna, Ed., Perspectives in Health. Volume 10, No. 1. 2005. Pan American Health Organization.
Myth: Any kind of international assistance is needed, and right away.
Reality: A hasty response that is not based on a needs evaluation can contribute to the chaos. It is better to wait until genuine needs have been assessed.
Myth: Things are back to normal within a few weeks.
Reality: The effects of a disaster last a long time. Countries deplete much of their financial and material resources in the immediate post-impact phase. Successful relief operations take account of the fact that donor interest tends to wane as needs and shortages grow more pressing.
Myth: Foreign medical volunteers with any kind of medical background are needed following a disaster.
Reality: The local population almost always covers immediate life-saving needs. Only medical personnel with skills that are not available in the affected country are usually needed.
Myth: Dead bodies, left unburied, are a dangerous source of disease epidemics after disasters.
Reality: Disaster victims' bodies pose little or no threat to public health.
Myth: Burying victims quickly in mass graves gives survivors a sense of relief.
Reality: Survivors have a strong need to identify lost loved ones and grieve for them in customary ways.
Myth: Natural disasters cause deaths at random.
Reality: Disasters cause more damage to vulnerable geographic areas, which are more likely to be inhabited by poor people. Especially in developing countries, disasters take a greater toll on the poor.
Myth: Locating disaster victims in temporary settlements is the best alternative.
Reality: It should be the last alternative. Funds may be better spent on building materials tools, and other construction-related support in the affected country.
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