Synopsis
In recent years, an increasing number of countries have suffered from instability, insecurity, and conflict. Compounding the problem is endemic state incapacity to protect citizens and provide adequate security. Civilian police are a central security sector institution, given their primary responsibility for establishing and maintaining order and security. However, burdened by corruption, low wages, and a lack of training and resources, the police are commonly viewed by society as irrelevant to citizens and in some cases, as victimizing the population. While security sector reform is complex in most developing countries, it is particularly problematic in post-conflict countries. Post-conflict situations often require police assistance to address the "security gap" created between demobilization and reform of military forces that had usurped domestic security responsibilities.
In this session, the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation will provide an overview of the importance of security to development, USAID's authority to operate in this field, USAID's role in security sector reform/police programs, and types of police programming that may be conducted. In an interactive case exercise, participants will discuss whether police assistance is appropriate, and if so, which types of programming would best suit the case country. The session will conclude with a discussion of the issues identified and possible approaches to address them.
Notes
The premier session of the 2005 USAID Summer Seminar Series, Exorcising Demons of the Past: Seizing New Opportunities to Promote Democratic Policing, was presented by Elizabeth Hume, Conflict Specialist, DCHA/CMM and Michael Miklaucic, Democracy Specialist, DCHA/DG. This seminar focused on USAID’s experience, the utility of police assistance as a development tool, and how to measure the opportunity costs of involvement in this field. Hume opened the largely interactive session by asking the audience, “Why should USAID support law enforcement in its programs?” The variety of responses from the audience demonstrated the centrality of security to development and that security is essential for putting a country on a development path. Without security, a country is far less likely to achieve any significant progress in development. Crime and lawlessness pose a direct threat both to economic growth and democratic governance, two of USAID’s central goals. However, it was stated that there are significant risks attached to providing assistance to law enforcement agencies in program countries.
Miklaucic gave an historical overview of police assistance programs and also explained the evolving role of USAID and predecessor agencies in these projects. Immediately following World War II, the U.S. armed forces were charged with providing basic services, including law enforcement, in occupied Japan and Germany. This effort extended to other countries in the following several years, but in 1954 the Eisenhower administration determined that a civilian agency was more appropriate for the management of overseas civilian policing programs. The assignment was given to the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), a predecessor to USAID. FOA conducted police training operations in Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Nepal, Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Lebanon, and Egypt in addition to many other countries. Given that many of these program countries were on the front lines of the Cold War, the police assistance programs largely addressed the threat of insurgency and communism.
In 1962, a National Security Action Memorandum created the Office of Public Security (OPS) within the newly established USAID to manage what had come to be known as the Public Safety Program. This was prompted by the need to “coordinate, centralize, and rationalize these civilian training programs.” Miklaucic commented that the fact that the OPS director reported directly to the USAID administrator was a sign of its priority in the agency. By 1968, OPS had programs in 34 countries and had an annual budget of $60 million, equivalent to $350 million today.
Following allegations of human rights abuse in program countries in Latin America and South East Asia, Congress terminated the Public Safety Program in 1974. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (FAA), Section 660, prohibited USAID from engagement with law enforcement agencies. As Miklaucic discussed the legitimate reasons for the prohibition, he also emphasized that no study ever declared the Public Safety Program a failure.
Miklaucic explained that during the following decade, USAID was granted certain exemptions from the prohibition on police assistance because of several events. The first was the 1980 assassination of the American Maryknoll sisters in El Salvador and the subsequent inability or unwillingness of the Salvadoran authorities to hold anyone accountable for this crime. Following this, the Kissinger Commission in the early 1980s concluded that the lack of security, stability, and what is now termed “good governance” was impeding development in Latin America. Despite the comprehensiveness of the 1974 ban, the Congress agreed with the need for assistance programs to “help develop institutions of the administration of justice.”
Beginning in 1985, a series of exemptions to FAA Sec. 660 was “carved out.” The first exemption authorized USAID to conduct police assistance programs in Latin America dealing with prosecution and the judiciary. In 1996, this was expanded to include the use of development assistance and economic support funds for law agencies in countries coming out of conflict. Miklaucic explained that USAID found itself working with “judges, prosecutors, and public defense and its programs were compromised by its inability to work with law enforcement agencies, which are integrally tied to the justice system as a whole.”
The 2002 National Security Strategy of the U.S. effectively defined the goal of foreign assistance as the promotion of U.S. national security. The State-USAID Joint Policy Council created pursuant to the NSS debated the need for greater flexibility for the executive branch in working with foreign law enforcement agencies. A decision was reached to seek broader authority than allowed under Section 660 and its existing exceptions. In light of this paradigm shift, Miklaucic underscored that USAID’s “core mandate is using foreign assistance and development as a tool to support U.S. national security, and what we can now do with police and law enforcement is to make them part of the solution rather than part of the development problem.”
The need for USAID and similar agencies to be active in security sector reform was echoed by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and by many major NGOs. Moreover, USAID is not alone in this endeavor; the Departments of State and Justice are both involved in law enforcement assistance. The latter operates the Office of Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).
Congress responded to the need for police assistance programs as well as the heightened profile of foreign assistance in the NSS by extending USAID’s community policing authority worldwide in the 2005 Appropriations Act for Foreign Assistance. This applies to development assistance and economic support funds, but not Freedom Support Act funds or Support for East European Democracy (SEED) funds. Although limited to FY05 money, Miklaucic added that both the Senate and House versions of the FY06 budget retain this authority.
Miklaucic continued by describing the limits placed on USAID’s regained authority. USAID programs may not include “solving individual crimes; assistance in individual investigations and prosecutions; training for or assistance in implementing a specific ongoing law enforcement operation; commodity support for lethal technology and weapons; and support for or assistance in the carrying out of internal intelligence or surveillance operations.” Additionally, USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios signed a police assistance policy guidance further clarifying the terms of the exercise of USAID’s new authority in this field.
Following Miklaucic’s summary of the past and present state of USAID’s democratic policing authority, Hume discussed that while there has been a legislative prohibition restricting USAID law enforcement programs, exceptions to the law and USAID’s notwithstanding authority have enabled USAID to conduct many police programs (as outlined in a matrix that was handed out). She emphasized that USAID does have experience and a role to fill in this field. She provided four main criteria that define democratic policing. They are:
1. The actions of the police must be governed by law.
2. Police actions must not violate international principles of human rights
3. The police must be subject to external supervision with respect to both corporate law enforcement effectiveness and the behavior of individual officers in the performance of their duty.
4. The police must be responsive to the needs of individual citizens.
Hume then examined the relationship between democratic policing and community policing. She explained that over the years community policing has become the mantra of police reform in many countries and that this term is frequently used interchangeably with democratic policing. This is a mistake. Community policing may be a component of democratic policing but the terms are not interchangeable. Community policing mobilizes the public to “work with police as ‘co-producers’ of public safety.” Hume highlighted the success of domestic community policing projects such as neighborhood watch programs. Characteristics of community policing are:
1. Consultation by the police with communities;
2. Adaptation of police strategies to the requirements of particular communities or localities;
3. Mobilization of the public to work with the police to prevent crime; and
4. Adoption of problem-solving methodology as the fundamental strategy of policing.
USAID has amassed community policing program experience in Eastern Europe, South East Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Hume used the example of the USAID program in Jamaica, where USAID funded police and community training, deployment of bicycle patrols, and a community police facility. In addition, USAID helped to construct a “Community Services Center” that houses a police station, health services, a post office, and other community oriented services.
As both Hume and Miklaucic noted, civilian oversight of the police force is necessary if it is to be eligible for USAID assistance. According to Hume, civilian oversight is comprised of “people from outside of the police taking a role in calling the police to account for their actions, policies and organization.” This typically involves a system to handle complaints against the police with the goal of ensuring transparency and accountability to public institutions.
Reform of a law enforcement agency can be compromised or stalled by police corruption, and accordingly USAID has developed experience in anti-corruption initiatives. The USAID Mission in Bolivia has worked with police officers to implement the country’s Criminal Code of Procedure (CCP) and has partnered with the Attorney General to create an anti-corruption task force. Similar reform programs have been conducted by USAID in Nigeria and Rwanda.
Hume rounded out her half of the presentation by exploring the future of USAID police assistance programming. She suggested that USAID lead in the area of strategic planning in the field and ensure “broad coordination of developmental assistance” between USG agencies, NGOs, and embassy country teams. USAID should also focus on “long term sustainable development of law enforcement infrastructure” including police academy development to guarantee that new police officers incorporate “the principles… of democratic and community oriented policing.” Hume added that USAID should use its new authority to utilize police “in grassroots coalition building” where they can have an important impact on issues such as domestic, religious, and ethnic violence.
Hume concluded by reemphasizing USAID’s multi-decade experience in this field, the need to focus on long term law enforcement infrastructure development, and that the decision to implement a police assistance program should be consultative and based on a formal needs assessment. She emphasized that under this new authority prior consultation with the Congress is required. She also emphasized that USAID is developing a strategic, holistic and effective agency response in this area and USAID should look to see where it can complement and build on other existing USG programs. She noted that CMM and DG have compiled research documents and both offices will have procurement mechanisms out this year that address security reform issues. Both presenters underlined the centrality of law enforcement forces as the first “interface that a citizen has with a state,” which determines “the nature of the social contract between the governors and the governed.” According to Miklaucic, improvements to the quality of this interaction increase the likelihood of moving a country towards a “democratic social contract.”
Question and Answer Session
Can USAID support law enforcement in an authoritarian regime?
Hume: A country where there is no movement towards democratic reform; where there is an authoritarian government; where there is no civilian control of the police-no absolutely, those are places where we would not think that it was a good idea for AID to get involved.
Miklaucic: Before this December 5, 2004 law was passed, when we realized it would pass, we determined immediately that we would need to have a policy that weighed out guidelines for how to implement or to operate under this authority. And I am happy to say that I found out this morning, Administrator Natsios signed the policy that was drafted last year on USAID police assistance.
The moment you get CNN or pictures of the police with the big sticks clubbing protestors and it gets out that USAID is supporting the police, how do you handle that public relations nightmare?
Hume: This is a question we have to take a look at, and it means we have to be cautious and make sure that there is sufficient civilian control and the country is on a democratic reform path, in addition to researching their human rights record.
Miklaucic: There are reasons to go forward and reasons not to, as a global agency and in every country. What we now have is the authority to weigh the positives and negatives and make an informed policy decision. That decision has to be made on a country by country basis.
How do you define a democracy? Because if you look at Uganda, where we have done many years of work, I don’t think anyone would define Uganda as a democracy, yet it is one of the best countries we have worked with in Africa, in terms of their will to implement change.
Hume: A lot of research shows that working with police, one of the best indicators is the will at the top to reform. And that is exactly what has happened in Uganda. The head of the police is a reformer.
Miklaucic: We are not talking per se about democracies but about democratization, which is the process leading to democracy. In my opinion we should be very hesitant to work in any capacity in a country that is not self-consciously trying to move towards democracy. Many of the countries that we do work in are more towards the “challenged” side of the spectrum but we work in those countries to help propel them towards democracy,
Do you have the series of indicators that you use to determine if a country is engaged in democratization? For example, multiparty elections are certainly not a good indicator.
Miklaucic: We have two full volumes of indicators; and Margaret Sarles, the director of the Democracy and Governance Office’s Strategic Planning Division, can provide you with those.
What are the risks of giving foreign assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies that you are concerned with?
Miklaucic: One of the risks we are concerned with is the compromising of other development programs. Within the public perception of U.S. foreign assistance program, all of our efforts are now branded as “USAID: From the American People” so we are very publicly visible; if those efforts are contaminated by an unfortunate experience with one of our police assistance programs, you could have the whole program purged from a country. That is a significant risk, and public relations are not an insignificant risk. There are also legal risks if someone gets hurt, what if one of our contractors is killed in action. There are significant risks, and I don’t want to downplay them, which is why no country mission should jump into this without significant consideration.
By getting involved in restructuring a police force, is USAID biting off more than it can chew?
Hume: Everything is a tradeoff, and you have to look at each individual country and determine if you can have an impact there. We are not saying that every country program should rush into this, because like Michael [Miklaucic] said, this does not come with additional funds. So again, it is for each country program to decide and to determine if there is a possible benefit that justifies the costs.
Comment from audience: It’s not just about reducing crime rates, it’s also about legitimizing and building institutions and promoting good governance, so I think it [police assistance] can be part of the consolidation of democracy.
How will you determine the success of any law enforcement assistance program, given that crime rates are poor indicators? For example, a crime rate could be really low in a country where the population fears the police so much that they are too afraid to report a crime. While if you have a successful community policing program, and all of a sudden people are coming forward and reporting crimes, this would produce a spike in the crime rate.
Miklaucic: You are right to point out that the indicators of the success of a police assistance program are not self-evident. Statistics can be used to justify a lot of different things. We don’t have yet a comprehensive set of indicators, nobody does except maybe ICITAP [International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program]. We’re entering this with a lot of humility and we’re going to have to sit down and ask ourselves how will we tell if the program is successful. As Liz [Hume] pointed out, the poor consider crime and insecurity as the greatest threat.
You mentioned that as we have seen in field offices that security is absolutely a primary concern, but security is not just the police. Often times this means that law enforcement or security is provided by people in militias. How does this fit into the larger context of working across the board on security? Where is the center of gravity in USAID for security in development, not just policing.
Hume: As Michael mentioned this is a broader part of security sector reform that I think the donors are looking at. But we [USAID] are prohibited from using development assistance for working with militaries or informal militias. This poses significant challenges, for example, in northern Uganda most policing functions are provided by informal militias, and if they are not under some credible civilian authority then we can’t work with them. So indeed, that is one of the biggest stumbling blocks that we come up against. That being said, we haven’t even talked about the post-conflict setting where there is a security gap and in places like Kosovo, where the international community, was able to start from scratch. We were able to setup a pretty impressive police academy there, so I think there are different ways to look at it. We may determine that we have to start from scratch or we may find enough there already under civilian authority to work with.
Is USAID trying to centralize the coordination of its civil society efforts and its community based efforts, to try to promote security and development in a transition environment?
Hume: That would be the holistic point of view– of not even looking at it just from the perspective of the justice sector, but also pulling from our other programs. And in a lot of areas, like at-risk youth programs, why not pull the police in and use them in schools. Kosovo is the perfect example of this, where police could be used to target at risks sections of the population. And in fact, the UK’s DFID [Department for International Development] is piloting a community police program in Kosovo.
